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PREFACE 
This thesis .represents an Attempt to examine, in a 
particular historical context, the relationship between 
the system designed to regulate industrial conflict in 
'!'Tew Zealand and the kind of' conf'lict which ensues as a 
result of' the existence of that system. 
i'he central event is the waterfront stoppage of 
1951 which, over a period of' f'i ve months, resulted in 
the loss of more than a million working days to New 
Zealand industry. 
A period of strife of the magnitude of the 1951 
crisis could have served to perpetuate traditional 
patterns of conflict. In the event trds does not seem 
to have happened. By over-reaching itself in 1951 the 
militant section of the industrial labour movement in 
New Zealand confirmed the attitude of the mode~ates: 
that direct action was a dangerous method for redressing 
grievances and securing concessions. 
In the decade after 1951 the incidence of stoppages 
and strikes was much lower than hitherto. The theme 
of this study is not that a period of conflict was 
followed by a decade of industrial harmony, but that 
the nature of industrial conflict itself underwent a 
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significant change. After 1951 conflict between workers 
and their employers was riot suspended, but it took place 
largely st a political level, in a way which obscured 
most of the visible signs of discord. 
Mr. J. F. Fardell, General Manager of the Christchurch 
'rr•ansport Board and I.Ir. K. McJJ. Baxter, National Secretar·y 
of the New Zealand Federation of Labour assisted this 
study by kindly providing material not readily accessible. 
Others, too numerous to mention, helped in various 
capacities and my thanks is also due to them. 
L. G. L. 
February 1966. 
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CHAPTER '1 
Introduction 
When politicians are urged to act according to the 
general interests of society they usually protest that 
they would not think of doing anything else. But in a 
society which recognizes that people tend to pursue what 
they regard as their own interests the work of politicians 
is not so simple. If the activity of politics serves 
the interests of society it does so,not because it 
! 
determines policies which are generally acceptable, but 
because it enables conflict between opposed power groups 
to be resolved by conciliation and compromise instead of 
by open trials of strength. 
The essence of politics is compromise. Politicians 
are involved in the everyday activities of political 
groups striving to achieve whatever a notion of good 
government means for each of them. By the elaboration of 
different aims the groups provide different solutions to 
the practical problems of government. The task of 
politicians is not to select any single solution but to 
arrive at a level ·of compromise which neither completely 
satisfies any of the groups nor completely antagonizes 
all of them. 
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Governments may successfully dispense with politics. 
Policies might be formulated with the aid of the Divine 
Will or the material dialectic, or any other force which 
is held to reveal the general interests of society. Such 
a government usually defends the "correctness" of its ··· ,. 
actions and is intolerant towards people who deny its 
infallibility. For those governed in this way the 
knowledge that truth is on their side may be adequate 
compensation for this lack of tolerance. They may be 
quite willing to make sacrifices in order to hasten the 
advent of the new age prophesied by their leaders. The 
language of politics is more self-interested: the mundane 
activity of resolving the conflicts which arise between 
different groups in society is the proper function of 
politics. 
That techniques exist for the peaceful resolution of 
conflict is the hallmark of a political society. In such 
a society the state ought to be viewed as a collection of 
institutions and rules providing an arena within which 
various groups can pursue diverging aims. Agreement upon 
the rules of the game does not prevent each group from 
trying to win, but the result is normally something less 
than complete victory. For this reason conflict itself 
has an important social function. The expression of conflict 
defines those who must be considered when any issue of 
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government arises.Where it becomes articulate conflict 
clarifies the line of disagreement between opposed groups 
and not only brings political problems to the attention of 
those concerned with government, but allows public scrutiny 
of the issues involved. Opportunities for the expression 
of conflict, no less than methods for resolving it, are 
essential for the health of the political community. 
Industrial conflict forms part of the wider dimension 
of political conflict. Since workers and their employers 
view the process of industry from different perspectives a 
certain amount of conflict is a fact of life in any 
industrial organization. Employees tend to assess their 
part in the process from the standpoint of their relatively 
short-term needs, especially in so far as it provides their 
livelihood and a certain degree of personal sec~rity. For 
their part most employers are more concerned with long-term 
factors, particularly investment and other aspects of 
business planning. They regard the proceeds of industry 
not solely as the means for satisfying immediate wants but 
as the source of capital which, by being transmitted for the 
use of future generations, will ensure the continued existence 
of the enterprise. The difference between these·attitudes, 
if not as irrevocable as some people believed, is likely to 
lead to friction between the workers and employers in any 
industrial undertaking. 
- 4 -
The most public manifestation of industrial conflict is 
the strike, the concerted cessation of work carried out by a 
number of workers in an attempt to redress their grievances. 
While they have undoubtedly become more important with the 
development of modern industry, strikes are not one of the 
new products of the industrial era. One of the earliest 
recorded was that of the Hebrew brickmakers in the fifteenth 
century B.C. 1 In the absence of effective political 
channels for workers to express their attitudes and air their 
grievances the strike was almost the only weapon for 
challenging the power of employers. With the rise of trade 
unionism and successive extensions of the franchise, workers 
had the choice of other techniques in their campaign to bring 
before their employers and the public their claims for 
increased wages and better conditions of work. Today, with 
the growth of an institutional arena within which conflict 
can take place in an orderly fashion between organized groups 
of workers and employers, the strike is only one aspect of 
industrial conflict - and not always the most important. 
To this extent industrial conflict in a political society 
may be largely sublimated. Industrial relations have been 
developed so that both employers and employees can pursue 
their own interests in a diplomatic fashion which suppresses 
1 Exodus V. 
- 5 -
most of the visible signs of discord. These are notable and 
spectacular exceptions when open conflict erupts in the 
form of a stoppage or a strike; but industrial conflict, 
like other forms of social conflict, typically takes place 
with a remarkable lack of aeerbity at an institutional level. 
Industrial relations are normally formed in two spheres: 
local relations at the place of work between the management 
and the trade union branch; and collective relations between 
unions of employers and unions of workers on a regional or 
national basis. The first involves personnel mnagement, 
foremanl control, and the settlement of local disputes. The 
second sphere of industrial relations forms the broad context 
within which the groups negotiate over wage rates, general 
working conditions and all other matters of more than local 
importance. 
The fact that these diplomatic contacts exist suggests 
that there can be more than a conflict relationship between 
employers and employees. In the last resort both depend on 
the success of their combined efforts for the successful 
prosecution of their own interests. There is an area of 
harmony within which workers and employers can work together 
if they recognize that unless the joint operation of industry 
is profitable their sectional interests cannot be served. 
Making an industry productive and profitable does not solve 
the problem of the division of the dividends of the combined 
activity, but it can provide a realistic basis for bargaining 
' 
between the groups. 
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When employers and workers attempt to reach agreement 
upon their respective shares of the proceeds of industry, 
in the light of their own interests both sides usually have 
equally valid justifications for their own bargaining 
positions. It has already been suggested that unless there 
is to be a trial of strength between the two the only 
solution is negotiation to compromise, or politics. Given that 
both groups usually want to avoid overt conflict, they also 
have a mutual interest in maintaining efficient machinery 
for negotiation and the settlement of industrial disputes. 
In this way they can ensure that conflict does not degenerate 
into an open contest of no advantage to either side. 
Industrial conflict is not always conducted in such a 
rational manner. Workers and employers may mistake their 
own long-term interests; they may even have a mistaken 
conception of their immediate interests. The type of conflict 
which ensues is likely to be characterized by a degree of 
animosity which exaggerates the importance of matters actually 
in dispute. Notions of an irreconcilfEdoile: .. battle between 
workers and their employers may be the decisive factor in 
determining the way in which the disputants view each other. 
Neither group may be prepared to admit that while, because of 
the nature of industrial work, there is ample scope for 
conflict between employers and employees, there is also an 
area of potential harmony within which they can work together 
to their mutual advantage. As a rational activity politics 
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is liable to be inadequate for dealing with attitudes which 
are rather more emotional but nonetheless real. 
The language of class conflict is in part the legacy 
of Karl Marx. When Marx uses the term 11 class 11 he refers to 
economic groups defined by their role in the productive 
process. Between different classes there is always an 
irrevocable clash of interests which at times develops into 
bloody class warfare and always ends with the annihilation 
of one of the contenders or with the destruction of both. 
The history of all hitherto existing society is 
the history of class struggles. 
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord 
and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor· and oppressed, stood in constant 
opposition to one another, carried on an 
uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a 
fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary 
reconstitution of society at la1ge, or in the common 
ruin of the contending classes.'-
In Marx's vi~. class struggles may become manifest as 
political struggles, but when they do the state is always 
ready to intervene in defence of the ascendant class, for by 
definition the state is the sum of the institutions which 
operate to preserve the ascendancy of one class. 1When the 
exploitation of workers is ended with the victory of &ommunism 
society will be classless, since all·citizens will be both 
owners and producers. Only with the removal of a special 
1 K. Marx and F. Engels: Selected ~orks, Vol 1, p.33. 
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class of owners will conflict cease. 
Despite the fact that attitudes towards Marx are uncertain 
and as often as not openly hostile, mainly because of his 
gratuitous reputation as the architect of the revolutionary 
excesses which have been carried out in his name, .Marx's 
thinking about class conflict has influenced many peopilie in 
a way which they undoubtedly fail to recognize. Whether 0n 
not classes in Marx's sense have ever existed people have 
often behaved as if they did, and to the extent that they 
have done so because they accept the Marxist analysis of 
society, that analysis have become self-fulfilling. 
Marx made a perceptive survey of the likely development 
of industrialization, but in the universal theory of class 
conflict which he distilled .:fuom the experience of mid-
nineteenth century Europe he understandably did not evisage 
the peaceful reforms which were to alter the nature of 
capitalism and fulfil most of his ideals without the bloody 
revolutions he predicted. 
According to the strategy unfolded in the Communist 
Manifesto, the proletariat was to be in the vanguard of 
revolution because of its strength and its important role in th( 
1 
economy. The early Communists turned their attention chiefly 
towards Germany for there they thought a bourgeois revolution 
was imminent. In the Marxist scheme of things such a revolutioJ 
was merely the prelude to the rise of the proletariat 
1 Ibid, p.40. 
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and the overthrow of capitalism. 
The development of modern industry cuts from 
under its feet the very foundation on which the 
bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. 
What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces above 
all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the 
victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable. 1 
But it is the most industr±alized countries which have 
evolved furthest away from the expectations of Marx. Here 
the demands of the masses for political and economic equality 
have been contained within a reformist rather than revolutionarJ 
ethos. They have seldom been accompanied by any serious 
movement to 11 abolish 11 the wages system and overthrow existing 
political institutions, precisely because these institutions 
have been flexible enough to meet the demands made upon them. 
As a revolutionary creed Communism has been successful only 
in countries which lack, according to Marx's criteria, the 
basic conditions for revolution. 
Nevertheless, in the age of the welfare state much of 
Marx's thought has adhered to ideas about industrial relations. 
Industrial workers seem to have discarded their revolutionary 
aspirations; but traditional ideas about the necessity for 
trade union "solidarity" and traditional suspicion about the 
motives of employers have been kept alive, largely because 
of the popularization of Marx's notion of class-consciousness. 
Throughout the Manifesto the theme is developed that it 
is not enough for the proletariat to have good reasons for 
1 Ibid, p.43. 
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waging war on the bourgeoisie. To ensure that the struggle 
is conducted successfully workers must have an awareness of 
their identity as a class. It is the task of the Party to 
foster this. By its leadership and inspiration the Party 
is to speed up the forces of history and hasten the birth 
of the new society; to make sure that the proletariat~ do 
not neglect to carry out their inevitable revolution. 
Shorn of its apocalyptic content, trade union leaders 
still use class language, and for obvious tactical reasons. 
To many people the idea that they are striving to fulfil 
worthwhile social aims has a strong appeal which is not 
diminished when their individual interests happen to be in 
accord with these aims. At times union leaders make the 
most of this feeling by raising the political conflict 
between employers and employees on to a moral plane. They, 
themselves, may have a very clear conception of what politics 
means in practice, but they may also be handicapped by the 
tactics which they use to gather support for their policies. 
The idea of irreconcilab1e. class conflict, which supposes 
that if one side gains any advantage it must be at the 
expense of the other side, explains why many industrial disputes 
are marked by a degree of intransige~ce out of all proportion 
to the matters being disputed. Although trade union leaders 
are as much aware as anyone that in most bargaining situations 
both sides can make mutually advantageous concessions, if 
they attempt to engage in such enlightened activity they are 
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likely to be regarded as renegades to their class. 
The values behind Marx's ideas of class conflict are 
little removed from current western social values. He 
believed that in the classless society all social and 
political inequalities would be smoothed out, the government 
being charged with the responsibility for maintaining a 
high material standard of living. But Marx thought that 
these conditions could only come about in a society where 
there was no division of interests and hence no conflict. 
It is one thing to recognize that different groups have 
conflicting interests; it is quite another to suggest that it 
is impossible to have a society which accommodates all of 
them. In a political society conflict is adcepted as a 
necessary social force. What is most important is not the 
fact that conflict exists, but the manner in which it is 
expressed and resolved. 
Contrary to Marx's expectations the evils which he 
thought were an inescapable part of industrialization have 
not been perpetuated. Far from kindling a revolutionary 
spirit, by its material success industrialization has 
smothered the spark of revolt. This does not mean that 
industrial conflict presents no problems, but most of the 
problems are amenable to political solutions within the 
existing framework of society. They need not depend for 
their solution upon any revolutionary social reconstruction. 
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In a society which has survived the dislocations of 
incipient industrialization the operation of industry should 
be regarded as the association of labour, capital and 
management in a combined effort to satisfy the needs of 
so~iety. Conflict over the spoils of the joint venture is 
strictly not between labour and capital at a primary level, 
but between all the different categories of people who 
contribute to production. In any industry groups of skilled 
workers may have just as many points of difference with 
groups of labourers or office workers as they have with 
their employers. The enlightened pursuit of group interests 
is the reason for the existence and the chief guarantee of 
the stability, of the political society. 
In such a society this political activity takes place 
within certain clearly defined limits. The distinction is 
often made between two main types of collective industrial 
relations: compulsory conciliation and arbitration, where 
the emphasis is placed on third party mediation in industrial 
disputes, supported where necessary by arbitration; and 
collective bargaining, where although mediators and arbitrators 
might be employed voluntarily, the settlement of disputes by 
direct negotiation is the typical pattern. 
To dvaw out the difference between the two, attention 
is usually focussed on the role of the government in each 
system. Collective bargain~ng is described as an orderly 
procedure where representatives of workers meet with employers 
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to bargain over the terms of their working relationship. 
The results of negotiations are contained in written 
agreements signed by the parties cqncerned. These documents 
specify the terms of employment and working conditions. If 
agreement is not forthcoming the parties may voluntarily 
decide to employ the techniques of conciliation or arbitration; 
or they may seek to support their demands with the sanction 
of direct action in the form of a strike orJockout. It is 
usually emphasized that where industrial relations are 
conducted according to a code of collective bargaining, 
except in periods of crisis, industrial conflict is the 
business of the disputants and government does not intervene 
except in so far as it may provide the machinery for 
voluntary mediation. 
On the other hand, compulsory conciliation and arbitration 
is regarded as a system where government plays a predominant 
role in that it has the responsibility for maintaining the 
machinery for settling industrial disputes. The function of 
conciliation is to bring the parties involved in a dispute 
into an area of agreement which can be the basis for compromise, 
While the ultimate settlement at this level depends on mutual 
agreement,1 the mediator plays a large· part in defining the 
terms of a possible solution. Arbitration depends not on 
internal compromises of this sort, but on decisions imp'os.ed 
from without. The basis of arbitratmon is the acceptance by 
each party of the authority of the arbitrator to make a 
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settlement. At either level the machinery for the regulation 
of conflict is thus provided by the state, for both 
conciliators and arbitrators are appointed by the government. 
In practice the differences between the two systems, 
although very real, are not as great as they appear. Iµdustrial 
relations in the United States may be regarded as a good 
example of collective bargaining in action, but a number of 
recent Federal acts, chief among them the Labour Management 
Relations Act 1947 and the National Labour Relations Act 1961, 
have extended the control of the Federal ~overnment over 
industrial relations. The right of employers or workers to 
take direct action, long held to be a distinctive feature 
of collective bargaining, has been restricted by the 
establishment of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 
Either party wishing to negotiate a new wage contract is 
now obliged to give two months' notice of i t-s intentions, and 
if no agreement is reached within the first month the 
mediation authority must be notified. If in the following 
month the authority fails to break the deadlock, only at the 
expiry of the full two months may a strike or lockout legally 
take place.i'I 
The role of the President of the United States has also 
been enlarged. If he is of the opinion that a strike or 
lockout will imperil the national interest the President may 
1 "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in the United 
States". LEG Vol 13, No 4, pp.50 ff. 
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intervene in industrial disputes by securing an injuction 
from the Federal District Court which has jurisdiction over 
the contestants. The parties are then required to attempt 
to settle their differences through the Mediation and 
Conciliation Service for a further period of two months.
1 
As it has developed in New Zealand the system of 
conciliation and arbitration involves the compulsory 
conciliation of most disputes, but while under the American 
legislation either side may, with the qualifications already 
mentioned, have recourse to direct action after the initial 
"cooling-off" period, the New Zealand system expressly 
prohibits the use of the strike or the lockout, Despite this, 
however, the New Zealand pattern of industrial relations 
allows a considerable degree of bargaining and the use of 
direct action in a de facto form is by no means an exceptional 
occurrence in this country. 
In all countries where the development of industrial 
relations between secondary political associations is not 
proscribed, the state provides some part of the machinery by 
which industrial conflict is regulated. Workers and 
employers must operate within the limits of potential 
government intervention. What makes the regulation of industria: 
conflict in New Zealand unique is the stage at which the state 
assumes responsibility: the system of conciliation and 
arbitration largely determines what happens in the day to day 
1 Ibid, p. 51. 
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relations between workers and their employers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Regulation of Industrial Conflict in New Zealand 
The laws designed to regulate industrial conflict in 
New Zealand can be viewed under two aspects. There is a 
legislative framework within which industrial relations 
are obliged to develop and within which industrial 
conflict is normally resolved; and there are certain 
deterrents which seek to restrain excursions outside the 
limits of this framework. A description of the relevant 
legislative provisions will illustrate each of these 
aspects. 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
First enacted in 1894 after a series of industrial 
crises culminating in the maritime strike of 1890, the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in its original 
form involved a degree of state intervention in the field 
of labour relations unknown in the older industrial 
countries. New Zealand became the first country to 
establish a national system for the compulsory reference 
of labour disputes to arbitration when the methods of 
conciliation devised to deal with such disputes had been 
exhausted. 1 
1 For ari account of the origins of the I C & A Act, see 
N.S. Woods, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in 
New Zealand, pp.19 ff. 
- 18 -
The aim of the Act was to regulate industrial conflict 
by the procedures of conciliation and arbitration. The 
legislation was regarded only by the most optimistic as 
the means whereby all strikes could be prevented, but it 
was expected that the existence of legitimate avenues for 
the regulation of conditions of employment and the 
settlement of industrial disputes would greatly reduce the 
incidence of overt conflict. The Act was the result of an 
attempt to substitute an orderly method of bargaining within 
the restrqining boundaries of conciliation and arbitration 
for unrestrained tactics of direct negotiation supported 
by the sanction of direct action.At the point where 
negotiations between workers and their employers broke 
down mediators, and in the last resort arbitrators, were 
to assist in reaching peaceful ?ettlements of industrial 
disputes. 
Individual workers were given no status under the 
Act. It was thought that the advantages of orderly 
negotiation between organized groups of workers and their 
employers would encourage the formation of collective 
sets of industrial relations and deter irresponsible 
action. To this end the statute was entitled on Act "to 
encourage the formation of industrial unions and associations 
and to facilitate the settlement of industrial disputes 
by conciliation and arbitration. 11 
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After the failure of direct action during the maritime 
strike of 1890 the industrial labour movement in New 
Zealand was amenable to any legislation which promised 
to restore the bargaining power of the trade unions. 
Beginning in Australia over the dismissal of a seaman 
from the steamer "Corinna" for being a union delegate, 
the maritime strike quickly spread to New Zealand in a 
contest over the rejection by some employers of what 
workers claimed was their right to be organized in trade 
unions and represented by union officials. The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act not only recognized this 
right but made it clear that trade union development 
must be fostered in order to ensure that as many workers 
as possible belonged to organized groups within the scope 
of the procedures of conciliation and arbitratiori. 1 
Many employers were not similarly inclined to favour 
the new system, and for a time they refused to nominate 
representatives to sit on the Boards of Conciliation set 
up under the Act.2 Attitudes gradually changed when 
employers realiz.ed that their victory in 1890 was not 
permanent and that it was to their advantage to have a 
1 Although the Trade Union Act 1878 laid down that trade 
unions were not illegal and recognized their right 
to hold funds and take part in labour negotiations, 
this was not yet fully accepted by all employers. 
2 Woods, pp.50-54. The Boards were later Councils of 
Conciliation. 
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system for the peaceful settlement of disputes rather 
than to risk the dislocations to industry caused by 
frequent strikes. 
By the turn of the century both sides seem to be 
agreed that the Act offered the best guarantee for the 
orderly pursuit of their sectional interests. Although 
in the years to follow one side or the other at times 
withheld their support for the principles of conciliation 
and arbitration, the system became firmly entrenched in 
the industrial life of New Zealand. 
The System in Action 
Over the seventy years since the inception of the 
Act the system of conciliation and arbitration has been 
modified in many ways and the accumulation of these 
changes has resulted in several recodifications of the 
original legislation. 1 Apart from the initial experiments 
in the first years of the operation of the Act, and for 
three years during the depression when the provision for 
the compulsory arbitration of unsettled disputes was 
temporarily removed, the basic principles and procedures 
of the system have nevertheless remained remarkably 
constant. The techniques of conciliation and arbitration 
have become the methods by which most industrial disputes 
are settled in New Zealand. 
1 There have been more than forty amendments to the I C & A 
Act and five consolidations, the latest in 1qs4_ 
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Once an industrial dispute arises the machinery of 
the Act enables a Council of Conciliation to be convened 
under the chairmanship of a Conciliation Commissioner, 
an official of the Crown. 1 The technique of arbitration 
may not be used until the channels of conciliation have 
been exhausted, and to this end no dispute can be 
referred to the Court of Arbitration, the central 
institution of the system, until it has first been placed 
before a conciliation council in accordance with the 
regulations. 2 
At conciliation hearings the parties are represented 
by an equal number of assessors, all of whom must have 
had experience in the industry in which the dispute has 
ariseri..3 The task of the Council is to assist the parties 
1 The term "industrial dispute" has a specific legal 
connotation: where it is shown that employers or 
workers have rejected a log of claims for changed 
conditions of work an "industrial dispute" is 
deemed to exist. This definition was laid down in 
Cromwell and Bannockburn Colliery Co. v. Board of 
Conciliation for Industrial District of Otago and 
Southland. NZLR, 1906, p.986. 
2 NZS 1951, No. 239, S.28 (1) altered arrangement 
wher~by s9me disputes were hear~ in the first 
instance by the Court of Arbitration. 
3 NZS 1925, No. 24, S.41 (6). Except that where 
this is impracticable one assessor on each side 
may be appointed who is not so qualified. 
- 22 -
to reach agreement over the matters in dispute: 
It shall be the duty of the Council to endeavour 
to bring about a settlement of the dispute, and 
to this end the Council shall, in such a manner 
as it thinks fit, expeditously and carefully 
inquire into the dispute and all matters 
affecting the merits and the right settlement 
thereof. 
In the course of the inquiry the Council shall 
make all such suggestions and do all such 
things as it deems right and proper for inducing 
the parties to come to a fair and amicable 
settlement of the dispute.1 
The legislation thus makes it quite clear that the task of 
the council in assisting the parties to reach an agreement 
is not to be confounded by excessive formality. 
The role of the Conciliation Commissioner as chairman 
is limited so that he does not become merely an arbitrator 
at a lower level. In procedural matters if the assessors 
are equally divided the Commissioner has a casting vote 
and the decision of the council is determined 
accordingly. 2 This helps to ensure that proceedings do 
not become deadlocked over relatively minor points of 
difference. Where the main issues in dispute are concerned, 
while it is the Commissioner's duty to suggest possible 
compromises, if the parties remain equally divided he may 
not use his casting vote to determine the decision of the 
council. The ultimate basis of settlement at the stage of 
conciliation rests upon compromise between the parties 
concerned. 
'1 Thi d • ' s . 46 
2 ibid., 
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If the parties arrive at a settlement during the 
course of a conciliation hearing the terms of the 
settlement may be set forth either as an industrial 
agreement~binding only on the immediate parties, or they 
may be forwarded to the Court of Arbitration to be made 
into an award,, enforceable on every employer and employee 
in the area and industry to which it relates. 1 Failing 
settlement the dispute is then ref erred to the Court for 
arbitration. 
The Act obliges the Court of Arbitration to sit in 
each of the four main centres at least once every three 
months to deal with disputes which have been referred to 
it, with provision made for extra sittings if the Court 
thinks fit. The Court is constituted by a judge who holds 
permanent appointment, and by one representative each of 
workers and employers appointed for three-yearly terms. 
It has wide-reaching powers to deal with the disputes 
within its jurisdiction. In all matters before it the 
Court has "full and exclusive jurisdiction" to determine 
them in such ways as in equity and good conscience it 
thinks fit. 2 The function of the Court is to arrive at 
a fair settlement of industrial disputes and to assist 
the Court in this activity it is expressly laid down that 
the proceedings of the Court are not to be impeached for 
want of form.3 
1 See below p. 31. 
2 NZS 1925, No. 24, S.80 . 
.,...., • , ("'"'j r-..,--, 
- 24 -
The effect of this provision is to place the 
Court of Arbitration absolutely beyond the 
control of or interference by the Supreme 
Court, however erroneous in fact and in law 
its judgments may be, provided that the Court 
of Arbitration purports to act in pursuance 
of the Act and confin1s itself to the subject 
matter of the Act .... 
The Court may thus admit any evidence which it considers 
relevant to the disputes within its purview. The 
conciliation hearings are the source of much of this 
information. The council may deliver to the Court a 
memorandum of matters settled at the hearing despite the 
fact that other issues are still in dispute, and the 
Court, if it wishes, may include such a memorandum in any 
award it might make without reopening enquiry into the 
nature of the partial agreements. In the words of a 
former Judge of the Court of Arbitration, "while the 
Court •.• is not bound to accept the terms of a partial 
settlement reached in conciliation, it is loath to 
interfere with the clauses framed by the representatives 
of the partiestt. 2 Prior to a dispute being referred there 
for arbitration the Conciliation Commissioner may also 
advise the Court as to the suggested basis for the 
settlement of a dispute, providing that this is unanimously 
agreed upon by the parties concerned. In these ways where 
complete settlement is not, reached at the level of 
1 A.J. Mazengarb, ~ndustrial Laws of New Zealand, p.51. 
2 A. Tyndall, The Settlement of Labour Disputes in New 
Zealand, p.34. 
- 25 -
conciliation the work of the council enables the Court to 
have a clearer understanding of the ramifications of a 
dispute. 
New Zealand's system of conciliation and arbitration 
thus combines two different techniques for the resolution 
of industrial conflict. The task of arbitration is to 
deal with intractable disputes, not by aiding the parties 
to reach their own level of compromise but by imposing 
the external decision of a third-party. The function of 
arbitration is essentially regulatory in that it prevents 
many disputes from degenerating into open contests; but 
while the arbitration of unsettled disputes may preserve 
industrial peace it does not provide the basis for 
enlightened industrial relations. 
In theory the goals of conciliation are wider than 
those of arbitration. The existence of conciliation 
machinery gives rival groups the opportunity to discuss 
the fundamental issues which lie at the heart of most 
industrial disputes. In practice the technique of 
conciliation may be focussed on immediate points of 
difference at the expense of this wider view; but relying 
as it does on a certain spirit of compromise, the principle 
of conciliation at least offers the chance that workers 
and employers will develop closer contacts, to their 
mutual advantage. 
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Although the compulsory reference of disputes, in 
the first instance to conciliation councils, and where 
unsettled to the Court of Arbitration would seem to 
imply as a corollary the prohibition of strikes and 
lockouts, since these institutions are alternative and 
legitimate channels for the expression and resolution 
of industrial conflict, this was not emphasized in the 
original legislation. Under the 1894 Act either of the 
opposing sides could resort to the use of direct action 
after the advent of a .dispute, providing that neither 
formally objected to such an action. If either side 
employed the machinery of the Act strikes and lockouts 
then ~ecame illegal, but only until the Board of Conciliation 
or the Court of Arbitration gave its decision. 
In 1908, however, strikes and lockouts were declared 
illegal for all industrial unions and associations of 
workers and employers coming within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. 1 While it was appreciated that .the existence 
of alternative methods for settling industrial affairs 
would not prevent all strikes, the prohibition of direct 
action, however ineffective in practice, made the point 
that registration under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act conferred certain rights in exchange for 
certain responsibilities. 
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The Labour Disputes Investigation Act 
Registration under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act is voluntary and the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act is an alternative set of legislation 
designed to regulate industrial conflict in industries 
outside the jurisdiction of the conciliation and 
arbitration system. Introduced in 1913 following a series 
of industrial stoppages in the mining and waterfront 
industries, the Act applies to all workers and associations 
of workers not bound by an award or agreement of the Court 
1 of Arbitration and to the employers of these workers. 
Under the Labour Disputes Investigation Act workers 
who otherwise would have no recourse to conciliation may 
invoke the assistance of a Conciliation Commissioner or a 
Labour Disputes Committee in settling disputes concerning 
their conditions of employment. Where this procedure is 
used the workers involved must give notice of the dispute 
to the Minister of Labour, specifying the parties concerned 
and setting out the nature of their ciaims. 2 It is the 
responsibility of the Minister to determine the way in 
which the dispute will be dealt with. He may refer it to 
a Conciliation Commissioner, who is then obliged to summon 
a conference of the parties and conduct a hearing similar 
to the conciliation hearings under the Industrial 
1 Such unions are registered under the Trade Union Act 
1908. 
2 NZS 1913, No. 75, B.4 (1). 
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Conciliation and Arbitration Act; or he may pass the 
matter on to a Labour Disputes Committee, a tribunal 
consisting of not less than three nor more than seven 
members as decided by the Minister. 1 Workers and 
employers are represented equally on the Committee and 
it is provided that on their appointment they may elect 
an independent chairman. If the representatives fail to 
agree on the choice of a chairman it is the responsibility 
of the minister to appoint a suitable person to that 
office. 
The task of the Committee is to investigate the 
nature of a dispute and endeavour to reach a settlement. 
Like the hearing convened by the Conciliation Commissioner 
its function is essentially conciliatory. But while the 
methods of conciliation are in these ways available to 
workers outside the scope of the conciliation and 
arbitration legislation, there is no machinery for the 
arbitration of disputes unsettled at the level of 
conciliation, workers retaining the legal right to strike. 
This right is not unqualified. Before workers not 
bound by an award or agreement of the Court instigate 
strike action they must fulfil certain procedural 
responsibilities. If settlement of a dispute is not 
reached during the sitting of a Labour Disputes Committea, 
the Committee is directed to include in its report to the 
1 Ibid., S.5 (1) 
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Minister of Labour such recommendations for a future 
settlement as it thinks fit, and if the members are 
equally divided in opinion, instead of making recommendations 
the workers and employers may submit separate proposals 
for settling the matters in dispute. 1 If the dispute is 
still unsettled within fourteen days of the final meeting 
of the Committee, the Registrar of Industrial Unions is 
obliged to conduct or supervise a secret ballot of the 
workers concerned to ascertain whether a strike shall 
take place. 2 Only if a majority of the workers approve 
is the use of direct action legal. 
The Labour Disputes Investigation Act is thus 
concerned with two aspects of industrial conflict. Its 
positive role is to supplement the machinery of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act by enabling labour 
disputes outside the scope of this act to be settled by 
the technique of conciliation, the results of this activity 
being set down in industrial agreements. 3 In its negative 
aspect the Labour Disputes Investigation Act is an attempt 
to seal off an area of potential industrial turbulence by 
specifying the steps which must be taken between the advent 
of a dispute and the use of direct 'action. By requiring 
workers to notify the Minister of Labour of the existence 
of a dispute and to participate in a secret ballot to 
1 Ibid., S.6 (3) 
2 Ibid., S. 7 
3 These have the same force and scope as industrial 
agreem@nts made under the I c R,. A Ard:_ 
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deoide whether or not they will strike, the Act reduces 
the likelihood that they will become involved in 
precipitate conflict. 
The Centripetal Nature of the System 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act does 
not apply to government employees, but industrial relations 
throughout the rest of the economy are almost completely 
dominated by the legislation. In theory, workers in the 
employment of privately owned businesses have the right to 
choose between the procedures of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act and those of the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act, but in practice the choice is largely 
illusory. N.S. Woods, the present Registrar of Industrial 
Unions, makes this point succinctly: "Registration under 
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act is entirely 
voluntary, but the advantages of registration while not 
coercive are strongly persuasive. 111 
Unions outside the scope of the Act retain a limited 
right to strike legally and it might be expected that the 
more militant unions would avail themselves of this 
advantage. At the most, however, this has proved to be 
little more than a residual right, restricted as it is not 
only by the provisions of the Labour Disputes Investigation 
Act but by the operation of the Police Offences Amendment 
Act 1951, which virtually prohibits picketing and makes 
1 Woods, p.'15. 
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effective strike action even more difficult to carry out. 1 
. At times the limited right to instigate direct action has 
been suspended altogether: for the twelve year currency 
of the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations, first 
introduced in 1939 as a war measure, all strikes and 
lockouts were placed under a legal ban. 
The doubtful advantages arising from the legality of 
limited strike action are outweighed by several 
organizational disadvantages. Under the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act industrial agreements, enforceable only 
on the immediate parties, are the sole form of documentation 
for setting out wages and conditions of employment. As 
a consequence the scope of negotiations under this Act 
tends to be limited, the advantages gained by either side 
being restricted to the immediate parties in a dispute. 
Awards made under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act have a far wider application and thus serve to produce 
a large measure of uniformity in the minimum wages and 
conditions of an industry without an excessive duplication 
of negotiations between workers and their employers. The 
so=called "blanket clause" of the Act gives awards the 
effect of binding every employer and employee in the area 
and industry to which the document relates, irrespective of 
whether or not they take part in the hearings which produce 
the award. 2 
1 See below, p. 82 ff. 
2 NZS 1925, No. 24, S.89 (3) 
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As few as five people may form themselves into an 
industrial union of workers registered under the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, but by virtue of the 
"blanket clause 11 further organizational disadvantages face 
workers who seek to organize outside the confines of the 
1 
Act. If a group of workers not belonging to a union 
registered under the Act seek to strike in accordance with 
the regulations of the Labour Disputes Investigation Act 
the legality of their action may be nullified by the 
actions of a dissident group of workers in the same industry 
in forming themselves into an industrial union and obtaining 
an award which binds the remaining workers in the industry. 
Such a manoevre, known to staunch unionists as "scab unionism", 
is a potent threat to any union which operates outside the 
boundaries of the conciliation and arbitration system. 
Between 1936 and 1961 this threat was reinforced by a 
statutory direction which required the Court of Arbitration 
to include in every new award a clause stating that it was 
unlawful for any employer to continue to employ any adult 
who was not a member of the industrial union or association 
2 
of workers to which the award related. This provision 
was the legal basis of the unique New Zealand system of 
compulsory unionism. 
1 To be eligible for registration a society of employers 
must have not less than three members and a society of 
workers either not less than fifteen or not less than 
a quarter of the total number of workers engaged in 
the industry in the area concerned, with an absolute 
minimum of five. 
2 NZS 1936, No. 6, S. 18. 
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Before the 1936 amendment to the Act brought 
compulsory unionism into being the Court of Arbitration 
had made a practice of including in many awards clauses 
giving preferential status to union members, thus fulfilling 
one of the aims of the Act by encouraging the development 
of industrial unions. Once employed, however, non-unionists 
were treated on the same basis as unionists because of the 
operation of the "blanket clausen, and this caused 
grievances among union members who felt that as the 
benefits gained by union negotiation were enjoyed by all 
workers, every person should be compelled to belong to 
the union which negotiated the terms of his employment. 
This was accomplished after the election victory of the 
Labour Party in 1935, the new statutory direction 
amplifying the compulsory character of New Zealand's 
system for regulating industrial conflict. Prior to 1936 
the system had combined three kinds of compulsion: the 
compulsory reference of labour disputes, the compulsory 
application of awards, and the compulsory prohibition of 
work stoppages. To these wasu now added a fourth, 
compulsory union membership for all workers covered by an 
award of the Court. 
Despite the fact that the system was becoming more 
rigid, compulsory unionism tended to pull unions still 
outside the jurisdiction of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act within the orbit of the system. If a 
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union remained registered under the Trade Union Act arid 
hence within the scope of the Labour Disputes Investigation 
Act, it had to rely on voluntary membership and it was 
always faced with the threat of replacement by an 
industrial union covered by an award. After 1936 this 
was perhaps the most compelling reason why unions sought the 
refuge of the system. Unless they refused to accept the 
degree of regulation inherent in a system which sought to 
rationalize industrial relations unions were assured of 
a large membership and a stable existence within the 
confines of the system. 
The removal of state-enforced compulsory unionism in 
1961 has not yet materially altered this situation. Since 
1962 the compulsory membership clause has not been 
automatically included in awards, but the Court still has 
power to specify preference clauses. These are of two 
kinds, unqualified preference clauses which make membership 
of a union a condition of employment and thus preserve the 
compulsory character of the defunct legislation; and 
qualified preference clauses which require employers to 
give preference of employment to union members.1 The 
advantages for unions in having either of these clauses 
included in their awards, if not as great as those arising 
from the old compulsory unionism provision, still out-
weigh the disadvantages facing unions which rely on 
voluntary membership because they are not registered under the 
1 See Woods. un.1q~ ff. 
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Act. 
Over the years the Court of Arbitration has been 
given special legislative authorization to alter 
industrial awards and agreements during their currency 
to give effect to general wage increases or decreases. 
Since 1950 this power has been conferred by the Economic 
Stabilization Regulations.
1 
The Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act itself specifies that rates of wages 
can be altered. only at the expiry of each award and 
agreement, and the special powers given to the Court to 
alter wage-rates simultaneously have fostered the growth 
of an ancillary system of wage regulation. The amount 
of the general wage orders granted by the Court is often 
considerable, the wages laid down in awards and agreements 
having been increased by as much as fifteen per cent in 
a single wage order. 2 
Except where it is specifically stated in industrial 
agreements made under the Labour Disputes Investigation Act, 
general wage increases granted by the Court in this capacity 
ham no application to the members of unions in the private 
sector of the economy not registered under the main Act. 
The role of the Court in regulating wages is thus another 
powerful inducement for unions to organize within the system. 
1 First enacted in 1950. There have been a number of 
subsequent amendments to the regulations, the latest 
in 1959. 
2 See below, p.48. 
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The advantages of registration under the Trade Union 
Act involve little more than the limited right to strike 
mn accordance with the procedures of the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act. The disadvantages are almost 
prohibitive. That the choice between the two sets of 
legislation for regulating conflict is largely illusory is 
borne out by the number of separate negotiations conducted 
under each act. Between 1950 and 1962 there were an 
average of 600 awards and agreements in existence each 
year. Over the period less than three per cent of the 
total number of documents regulating wages and conditions 
of employment in New Zealand were the result of negotiations 
conducted under the Labour Disputes Investigation Act. 1 
Penalties and Deterrents 
At times the system for regulating industrial conflict 
has itself been a primary cause of conflict because of the 
comparatively inflexible nature of wage regulation in 
New Zealand. The Court of Arbitration has no option but 
to view economic changes in retrospect and the fact that 
there is usually an interval of some months between the 
time when significant changes become apparent and the 
announcement of the decision of the Court in an award or a 
general wage order tends to preserve a belated degree of 
stability in the wages of those workers within the ambit 
1 AJHR, passim. 
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of the system. When prices are falling this delay works 
to the advantages of employees, but when prices and the 
incomes of other groups are rising rapidly, the trade 
union movement in New Zealand has often been divided by 
the different policies of the "arbitration" unions and 
those unions which advocate the use of direct action to 
gain wage demands. 
Controversy over the principles of conciliation and 
arbitration has at times led to the formation of rival 
~?:tiQn;al trade union organizations within the industrial 
labour movement. Trades Councils, based on their counter-
parts in Great Britain,, were one of the earliest forms of 
trade union expression in New Zealand. In many respects 
the early Councils were intensely conservative, following 
the British tradition of guarding the privileges of 
craftsmen who had passed through apprenticeships. After 
the collapse of the maritime strike in 1890 union activity 
within the industries of shipping, cargo-working, timber, 
mining and within other industries employing large numbers 
of unskilled labourers was at a low ebb, but the legislation 
of 1894 enabled workers in these industries to organize 
themselves in industrial unions and by the turn of the 
century these unions developed a strong militant wing in 
opposition to the Trades Councils. 
The first serious clash between the conservative and 
militant traditions occurred during the Waihi goldmine 
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strike of 1912, when the "Red" Federation of Labour set 
itself up as a rival to the Trades Councils for the 
allegiance of trade unionists throughout New Zealand. 
When the Federation collapsed the following year after 
a strike on the Wellington waterfront, a new militant 
body, the Alliance of Labour was formed combining 
watersiders, drivers, timber workers, miners, seamen and 
general labourers as the main affiliations. At the same 
time the Councils broadened their activities and became 
1 known as Trade and Labour Councils. 
The on9et of the depression weakened both types of 
\ 
organization and after the Labour Party came to power in 
1935 an industrial unity conference was convened under the 
presidency of the Minister of Mines, the Hon. P. Webb. 
The outcome of the conference was the formation in 1937 of 
the New Zealand Federation of Labour, from the beginning 
a compromise body uniting the conservative and militant 
wings of the industrial labour movement. 
Each attempt to form a militant trade union 
organization rested on the assumption shared by many 
workers that at certain times they stood to gain more 
through the tactics of collective bargaining, accompanied 
where necessary by strike action, than through the 
operation of the conciliation and arbitration system. This 
feeling was mainly confined to a few industries and the 
general explanation appears to lie in the nature of the 
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work performed: in these "industries and the extent of 
trade union support. 
Workers engaged in skilled activities have more 
reason to feel secure in their employment than unskilled 
workers. In times of unemployment their services are 
usually the last to be terminated and they are not likely 
to exhibit the defensive militancy common amongst unskilled 
workers who are aware of the precarious nature of their 
employment. When skilled labour is in short supply and 
wages are competitive skilled workers are likely to regard 
the wages they receive not as a measure of the success of 
trade union activity but of their own abilities. As a 
consequence the modern spirit of unionism among skilled 
workers is not particularly strong, and it is further 
weakened by the tendency for these workers to form small 
groups within any industry, "craft" unions rather than 
"industrial" unions. 
In industries which depend on large forces of skilled 
workers and employ a comparatively small number of 
labourers attitudes towards industrial relations are 
likely to be less than militant. Workers engaged in 
' 
printing, clerical work, the proviiion of domestic services, 
maintenance work and in many of the manufacturing industries, 
coming into contact as they do with groups having different 
working experiences than their own and organized· in 
different occupational unions are not likely to be imbued 
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with militant class attitudes. 
In industries which are characterized by large and 
relatively undifferentiated occupational groups attitudes 
towards industrial affairs are likely to be more positive, 
particularly where the work performed depends on large 
forces of unskilled workers. Lacking the personal 
bargaining power that the skilled worker possesses, the 
unskilled worker depends more on the success of the 
collective negotiations conducted by the union to which 
he belongs for the standard of his wages and conditions 
of employment. 
The drive for collective security, arising from an 
appreciation of the uncertain nature of unskilled employment, 
is fostered by the manner in which working operations in 
certain industries are carried out. Workers in the 
industries of shipping and cargo-working, coal mining and 
meat-freezing may perform specialized tasks, but the 
techniques involved in most working industries are acquired 
comparatively easily. Working together in large groups 
they tend to form close ties with their fellows and they 
are often paid piece-rates as members of gangs rather than 
hourly rates as individuals. Workers are closely 
concentrated at the place of work and the ship, the wharf, 
the mine and the freezing works becomes the unit of 
trade union organization and the focus of union loyalties. 
Much of the work undertaken is of a dangerous and 
- 41 -
obnoxious nature and in the ordinary course of work this 
results in many stoppages. 
Union strength appears to flourish where large 
numbers of workers share similar working experiences, have 
similar grievances and feel themselves to be part of a 
cohesive body. Small matters of complaint are more likely 
to result in stoppages of work in these industries than 
in undertakings with a more heteDogeneous labour force for 
union loyalties are strong enough for speedy and effective 
local action to be taken. 
The unions which benefit from these organizational 
advantages are inclined towards militancy and because of 
the economic importance of the industries in which they 
operate they often possess bargaining power denied to 
unions which rely for their membership on widely scattered 
groups of workers. Tested by participation in local 
stoppages, union strength may be projected on to a regional 
or national level in attempts to secure concessions through 
the use of direct action. To this extent overt conflict 
in some industries is accumulative, the tactics of militancy 
becoming the typical response in situations where 
negotiations at the level of conciliation reach an impasse. 
By 1951 the pressures acting to draw unions within 
the conciliation and arbitration system were strengthened 
by the development of penalties and deterrents designed 
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to prevent unions registered under the Act from exercising 
whatever collective bargaining power they might have. 
Recourse to the techniques of conciliation and arbitration 
for the settlement of industrial disputes was already 
almost obligatory, and the use of direct action was made 
correspondingly more difficult and dangerous. 
The pr·ohibi tion of strikes placed upon unions 
registered under the Act was perhaps the least important 
of these deterrents. Any person who incited, aided or 
abetted an unlawful strike was liable to a penalty not 
exceeding £10, while any industrial union or association 
of workers similarly involved was liable to a maximum 
penalty of £200.
1 
These penalties were not particularly 
high and in any case there was always a great deal of 
difficulty in imposing them. It was politically 
impracticable to make unions responsible for every strike 
since stoppages might be caused just as much by intransigencE 
on the part of employers as by union belligerency. It 
was even more difficult to exact penalties from individuals. 
The inadequacy of this method for controlling strikes 
was underlined by the 1947 Amendment to the Act which 
required any union registered under the Act to hold a 
secret ballot when it contemplated strike action.2 
1 NZS 1925, No. 24, S.124 (1). 
2 NZS 1947, No. 15, S.8. 
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Failure to conform to this direction rendered a.union 
liable to additional penalties in the event of an unlawful 
strike. All strikes were illegal but some were more 
illegal than others. 
Other methods for sealing off areas of industrial 
turbulence were potentially more powerful. The power 
given to the Minister of Labour to deregister unions for 
participating in unlawful strikes was probably the ultimate 
deterrent. This power had broadened in successive 
amendments of the conciliation and ar~itration legislation. 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1925 made 
provision for the suspension of unions for periods not 
exceeding two years for offences pertaining to unlawful 
strikes. At this stage the period of suspension was 
determined by the Court not the Minister, a union dealt 
with in this way being barred from taking:.,part in conciliatior 
or arbitration proceedings or from making any application 
for the voluntary cancellation of its registration for the 
duration of the suspension. 1 
Later amendments gave important powers to the Minister 
of Labour. In 1939 the Minister was empowered to cancel 
the registration of any industrial union 
... if in respect of any discontinuance of 
employment the Minister is satisfied that it 
has caused or is likely to cause serious loss 
or inconvenience ••. brought about wholly or 
partly by any industrial union of employers or 
workers.2 
1 NZS 1925, No. 24, S.12. Such a union was also denied 
recourse to negotiations under the L D I Act.· 
2 NZS 1939, No. 2, S.2 (1). 
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By virtue of the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations, 
introduced the same year, the "discontinuance of 
employment" included any refusal on the part of workers 
to accept engagement for any work in which they were 
normally employed and any act which had the effect of 
impeding the normal work in any industry. This made the 
potential scope of deregistration extremely wide and 
emphasized that if a union sought the privileges and 
protection of the Court of Arbitration it must reciprocate 
by fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act. 
The two statutory directions relating to compulsory 
unionism and the compulsory application of awards were 
the basis for the effectiveness of the threat of 
deregistration. Deregistration by the Minister of Labour 
left a union open for replacement by an "arbitration" 
union and to all the other disadvantages facing unions 
organizing outside the system. Trade union leaders who 
felt they had more to gain by collective bargaining and 
direct action used these tactics at their peril. 
In times of industrial crisis the government could 
also invoke the emergency powers contained in the Public 
Safety Conservation Act 1932. This act, introduced as an 
emergency measure d~ring the depression, enabled the 
government to take upon itself wide-reaching powers to 
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deal with serious strikes if the supply of essential 
coinmodities was threatened with interference or the 
public safety likely to be imperilled. 1 These powers 
were put to the test in 1951 when the most prolonged 
industrial crisis in New Zealandis history erupted on 
waterfronts throughout the country. 
1 NZS 1932, No. 3, S. 2 ( 1 ) • 
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CHAPEER 3 
The Origins of· the 151.21 Waterf'ront Crisis 
On 9 February 1951 waterfront workers at Wellington 
and New Plymouth re:fused to work overtime, in protest against 
the outcome of' wage negotiations which :for several months 
the New Zealand Waterside Workers Union had been conducting 
with the Port Employers Association. The workers involved 
were suspended by the employers and placed on a two-day 
penalty, rendering them ineJigi ble f'or employment f'or the 
duration o:f the suspension. Waterside workers throughout 
New Zealand :followed the lead of' the New Plymouth and 
Wellington workers and incurred the same penalties, and by 
19 Pebruary all ports were idle except Greymouth and Westport, 
where worlc ceased a week later. Normal work was not resumed 
until 15 July and in the inter•vening 151 days more than a 
. 1 
million man-days were lost to New Z~aland industry. 
The Wage Dispute 
Al though the New Zealand Waterside Worlcers Union was 
registered under the Industrial Concilia.tion and .Ar•bi tration 
1. LEG Vol. 2, No. 2, p.35. In the twelve-months period 
beginning 1 Jan 1951, 1,157,390 man-days were lost as 
a result o:f industrial stoppages. Apart :from the main 
waterfront stoppage and allied strikes all other stoppages 
throughout the year caused the loss o:f only 1+7, 778 man-days. 
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Act, through special legislative authorization waterfront 
workers came within the purview of the Waterfront Industry 
Authority, a statutory wage-fixing body in a direct line of 
descent from the~Waterfront Control Commission. The Commission 
was established in 1940 under the Waterfront Control Commission 
Emergency Regulations in an effort to utilize eff'ectively a 
limited shipping force in a time of national emergency. It 
was continued in a modified form after 1945 as a means of 
overcoming the difficulties inherent in the intermittent 
nature of waterfront work. 
The Waterfront Industry Authority, the institutional 
successor of the Commission, dealt with the wages and conditions 
of employment of waterside workers and with any disputes 
which arose in the industry. In these capacities the 
Authority exercised in a limited field the same type of 
jurisdiction as the Court of Arbitration, and together with 
the Government Railways Tribunal, the Post and Telegraph 
Staff Tribunal and the Coal Mines Council, other statutory 
wage-fixing authorities, formed an integral part of' the 
system for regu_lating wages in New Zealand. 
In May 1950 the Waterside Workers Union submitted a 
claim to the Port Employers Association for an increase in 
wages calculated to raise the basic hourly rate from 4s. to 
6s. The claim was rejected and the matter placed before the 
Authority for arbitration. A decision which increased the 
hourly rate by 3d. was issued in July by Deputy Judge Dalglish. 
This sum was not a permanent settlement, for in the 
interval between the hearing of the dispute and the announcement 
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of the decision of the Authority matters were complicated 
by a general wage order of the Court of Arbitration which 
increased the rates o~ remuneration payable to workers 
covered by awards and agreements by five per cent. This 
amount was an interim decision and a subsequent gene.ral order 
made in January of the following year fixed the general 
increase at fifteen per cent, including the five per cent 
of the interim judgment. Coming within the ambit of the 
Waterfront Industry Authority, the watersiders did not 
benefit automatically from general wage orders and on 8 
February 1951 representatives of the union and the employers 
met to discuss the implications of the latest judgment of 
the Court. 
The discussions took the form of direct negotiations 
between the two parties. The final offer of the employers 
was a proposed increase in the basic hourly rate to 4.7~., 
with proportionate increases in special cargo rates and meal 
1 money payments. This figure, the employers held, represented 
an increase of fifteen per cent on the hourly rate of 4s., 
an amount equivalent to the general increase prescribed by 
the Court. The representatives of the watersiders disagreed 
with this arithmetic: in their view the basic rate was 
4.3d. not 4s. and the final offer of the employers amounted 
to 4~., nine per cent not fif'teen per cent. 2 
The discrepancies arose from conflicting interpretations 
of the 1950 .decision of the Waterfront Industry Authority. 
1 • AJHR 1 9 5 2, H 11 , p. 21 • 
2. See D. Scott 151 Days, p.33. 
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The employers argued that;the 3d. per hour awarded by Judge 
Dalglish was computed on a similar basis to the interim 
_..g:etieral order of' the Court of' Arbitration. '11he union declared 
~at the settlement was at that time a final one and that 
the basic rate to which the f'if'teen per cent increase should 
be applied was therefore 4.3d. Both sides remained adamant. 
In the abse:nce of' effective third party mediation the 
stalemate developed into an open conflict. Waterfront stop-
work meetings were held on 9 February, the day after negotia-
tions finally collapsed and telegrams from the local branches 
of the Waterside Workers Union poured into the office of the 
national executive in support of a proposed ban on overtime. 
Wellington immediately institutes a forty-hour 
week ••• Napier utterly dissatisfied urge action ••• 
Auckland sto:pwork meeting unanimous in rejecting 
employers' offer ••• Bluff gives full support for 
any course of action taken by executive ••• 
Dunedin suggests all-in conference fair-dinkum 
industrial unions ••• Lytte1tbn endorses rejection ••• 1 
Wellington and New Plymouth led the way. Wherever 
overtime was offered it_was declined and the men involved 
suspended. In a final attempt to secure a negotiated agree-
ment the Minister of Labour, the Hon. W. Sullivan and fellow 
cabinet ·ministers met representatives of the :parties on 
16 February. .At this meeting the em:ployei-•s reaffirmed that 
they would not depart from their previous offer, although 
they expressed their willingness to allow the dl.spute to be 
settled by arbitration through the medium of the Waterfront 
Industry Authority or the Royal Commission recently established 
1. Quoted by Scott p.31. 
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to enquire into waterfront conditions. 1 H. Barnes, the 
national president of the Watersiders' Union rejected the 
sum offered by the employers and expressed his union's lack 
of confidence in the institutions named as possible avenues 
f'or arbitration. 
2 
Work on the waterfronts throughout New 
Zealand slowed to a halt and all ports were idle by 26 
Febru.ary. 
The battle was joined irrevocably. '.rhe Minister of 
J_,abour suspended the J?OWers of the Waterf'ront Industry 
Authority and under the authorj_ty of· the Public Safety 
Conservation Act a proclamation was issued declaring a State 
of Emergency, enabling the National Government to bring into 
operation extraordinary measures to deal with the crisis in 
the form of the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations. 
The original wage dispute was transformed into a t.rial of 
strength between waterfront workers and their employers, 
and the weight of' the CJovernment was placed firmly behind 
the shipowners and the principles of conciliation and 
arbitration. 
The Nature of the Conflict 
By refusing to work overtime the watersiders were applying 
the pressure of a partial strike to support their demand 
f'or the right to negotiate directly with their employers 
without the j_ntervention of a thj_rd party, whether the channel 
of mediation was the Waterfront Industry Authority, the Royal 
1. AJHR 1952, H 11, p.21. The Commission was convened on 
21 Sep 1960. 
2. Scott pp.35 ff. 
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Commission or the Minister of Labour. 1 In this way the 
dispute overflowed the legislative boundaries drawn to contain 
industrial conflict on the waterfront, and in the eyes of the 
Government represented a challenge to the principles o:f 
conciliation and arbitration. 
This aspect of the dispute was partly obscured by the 
way in which the union's original wage claim became linked 
with the question of the applicability of the general wage 
order o:f the Court. As far as the union was concerned even 
the full incorporation of' the fj.fteen per cent increase in 
the rate prescribed by Judge Dalglish would produce an in-
adequate basic wage. The fashion in which the employers' 
offer of 4-7~d. ~as computed was only seized upon to demonstrate 
what the union considered was a lack of good faith on the 
part of its adversaries. 
Maintaining. fthe watersiders.7 penny dif'ferential 
over the freezing workers, the rate would be 5/2 
an hour; maintaining the she.re of national income 
going to the workers before the war fought to 
bring a "new order 11 , the rate would be 6/-; 
maintaining parity with .Australian water·siders, 
6/3 ... 'rhis was just maintaining wateri'ront wages 
and yet the full 15% would. mean only 4/1 Ot an 
hour - and the shipowners of'f'ered 4/7t· 2 
At the heart of the dispute there was a clash not only 
over the amount of the proposed wage increase but ov~r the 
manner in which the increase was to b~ determined. Two 
opposed attitud.es to the f'undamentB.l problem of' ipdustrial 
relations wer·e involved: were the wages of' waterfront workers 
1 • Refusals to work "normal 11 amounts of overtime were a 
breach of the Main Order of' the Waterfront Industry 
Authority. 
2. Scott p.32. Original emphasis. 
- 52 -
to be decided by the applicatiori of wage-fixing principles 
by an external authority, or were they to be determined by 
the comparative strength of the contenders. 
It has already been suggested that the efficacy of 
conciliation as a method for regulEting industrial conf'lict 
depends on a certain spirit of compromise; while effective 
arbitration requires the mutual acceptance by disputants of 
the authority of the arbitrator to make a settlement. 1 The 
New Zeale.nd Waterside Workers Union withheld support f'or both 
principles in the light of what it considered to be the best 
interests of its members. As far as the union was concerned 
the controversy over the interpretation of the 1950 decision 
showed that the employers were not prepared to make a 
realistic compromise and in any case the increase granted 
by the Authority, however interpreted, oft·ered little hope 
that future resort to arbitration would result in any sub-
stantial further increase. Negotiations had reached an impasse 
and the watersiders were willing to employ diff'erent t2ctics. 
Over the years the union had built up a. strong corporate 
identity and it was quite prepared to f'all back on its own 
resources. The waterfront industry occupied a highly strategic 
position in the New Zealand economy. The imperative need to 
keep imports and exports flowing smoothly gave the watersiders 
considerable bargaining power in a country uniquely dependent 
on the success of its overseas trade. The natural strength 
of unionist feeling on the waterfront had been institutionalized 
nationally by the Industrial Conciliation and ii.rbitration 
1. See above, :p. 13 ff. 
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,Amendment Act , 19.36, which fo1' the first time contained a 
provision for the registration of national unions to cover 
1 the whole of any industry throughout New Zealand. 
Before this the New Zealand Waterside Workers Federa-
tion, the national body formerly representing waterfront 
workers, was hampered by the strong spirit of autonomy in 
the local port unions. With the registration of the new 
national union the port unions became local branches and 
surrendered the control of national affairs into the hands 
of the national executive. 
Af'ter the formation of the Waterfront Control Commission 
the union took part in the negotiation of national wage 
agreements, and the national body became firmly entrenched 
as the channel for the activities and aspirations of water-
siders throughout the country. 
Through the union journal The New Zealand Transport 
Worker the executive were able to keep in close contact with 
the "rank and file". With the emergence of Barnes as national 
president and T. Hill as national secretary the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers Union became the most powerful workers' 
union in the country, although at the height of its power it 
had a membership of no more than seven thousand. 
1. This was at the pleasure of the Minister of Labour, and 
subject to the proviso that such unions operated in at 
least four industrial districts and that all registered 
local unions in the same industry, or alternatively 
a majority of their members, agreed to the formation 
of the national union. 
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The Clash with the Pederation of Labour 
The growing strength of the union had repercussions 
within the ranlrn of the Federation of Labour, the national 
organization of workers' unions to which the watersiders were 
af'filiated. 'l'he Federation was an ins ti tutiona1 compromise 
uniting the militant and conservative wings of the industrial 
labour movement. As set o.ut in the original constitution the 
aim of the Federation of Labour was to 11 promote the complete 
organization of all workers by grouping them on the lines of 
class and industry to enable them to secure the f'ull value 
of their labour". This is the language of Karl Marx and 
illustrates the spirit of compromise which prevailed when 
the Federation was formed in 1937, the second year in office 
of' the new Labour Government. While the constitution of the 
Federation gave a large measure of autonomy to local and 
regional organizations, thus satisfying the representatives 
of the Trades and Labour Councils, the reference to "class 
and industry" perpetuated the tradition of militant unionism. 
The initial drive for unity was stimulated by the 
election victory of the Labour Party, for there was a general 
feeling that dissension within the ranks bf the trade union 
movement would jeopardise the political achievements of 
organized labour. Within a decade, however, real divisions 
were once more apparent .behind the facade of unity. F. P. 
Walsh, the foremost advocate of a moderate policy and the 
author of the 19~-6 report of the Federation of Labour which 
endorsed the Labour Government's policy of wage stabilization 
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was unseated from his vice-presidency at the 1947 annual 
conference of the Federa_tion. 1 .Al though he regained his 
position the following year the incident was not without 
significance for the future. 
Walsh's moderate policy was of comparatively recent 
origin. Early in 1928, at an open trade union conference 
jointly convened by the Alliance of Labour and the '11rades 
and J_,abour Councils Federation Walsh, then president of the 
Federated Seamens Union, together with A. McLagan, president 
of the United Mine Workers put for•ward proposals for the 
abolition of' the Industrial Conciliation and .Arbitration Act 
2 and the adoption of collective bargaining in its place. 
As vice-president of the Federation of Labour his 
attitude was somewhat- dif'f'erent. The voting arrangements at 
the annual conferences of the Federation gave the smaller 
unions a predominant voice if they acted in concert. 
Conference delegates were determined according to the member-
ship of financial affiliations on the basis of one delegate 
\ 
for unions with less than 250 members, two for unions having 
between 250 and 500 members, three for unions with a member-
ship of between 500 and 1,000, and thereafter one additional 
delegate per thousand members.3 On any important matter the 
militant unions were likely to be outvoted by unions which, 
deriving the bulk of their members from the compulsory unionism 
1. M. E. R. Bassett The 1951 Waterfroni Di_.§_pute, p.51. 
2. R. c. J. Stone A History of Trad~ Unionism in Ne~ Zealand 
1913-37, pp.100-1. 
3. Rules and Constitutio~, p.6. 
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clause of the Act, lacked bargaining strength of their own 
and depended almost entirely on the techniques of conciliation 
and arbitration f'or the standard of· their wages and conditions 
of employment. The policies which issued forth f'rom the 
national conferences were as a result essentially moderate, 
based as they were on support for the Labour Government's 
programme of stabilization and strict adherence to the 
principles of' conciliation and arbitration. 
During the F'irst World War the government of the day had 
introduced. measures f'or regulating prices through the agency 
of the Board of Trade set up under the Cost of Living Act 
1915. '11he intention was to protect consumers from abnormal 
price rises caused by shortages in essential commodities, and 
to enable the government to purchase at reasonable prices the 
goods required for the country 1 s war effort. 1 
Before the outbreak of the Second World War the Labour 
Government began to promote stability in incomes and prices 
by introducing impor·t controls designed to conserve overseas 
funds and insulate New Zealand against overseas price 
fluctuations. With the commencement of hostilities the need 
to produce a maximum war ef'f'ort and at the same time to 
distribute the burden equitably made a national policy of' 
stabilization necessary. In September 1940 an Economic 
Stabilization Conference was convened and the following year 
the Economic Stabilization Committee, later. to become the 
Economic Stabilization Commission, was brought into being. 
Under the Economic Stabilization Emergency Regulations 19Li.2, 
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the Minister of Industries and Commerce was charged with the· 
general administration of the system of control: 
••• the Minister shall be charged with·the general 
function of doing all things that he deems 
necessary or expedient for the general purpose 
of these regulations, and in particular for the 
stabilization, control, and adjustment of prices 
of goods and ser'vices, rents, other cos ts, and 
rates of wages, salaries, and other incomes, and 
for the direction and co-ordination ••• of the 
activitiei of all other persons or authorities 
having any functions in relation to any of those 
ma tter.s .1 
The main problem was to prevent excessive price inflation 
and fluctuations of the incomes of groups other than wage 
earners, since the techniques for controlling wages were 
already at hand in the Court of Arbitration. In the light 
of this the Federation of Labour supported the policy of 
stabilization, but with the provisos that the prices of 
essential goods, including foodstuffs, clothing and household 
necessities be stabilized adequately, or failing this, that 
the Court be empowered to increase wage rates simultaneously 
to offset increases in the cost of living.
2 
It was already an established custom that parties to a 
wage dispute might make reference to changes in the cost of 
living as revealed in the retail price index compiled by the 
Government Statistician. By the Rates of Wages Emergency 
Regulations 1940, an official link was established between 
wage rates and the price index, the Court being empowered to 
issue general wage orders increasing o~ decreasing all wage 
rates laid down in awards, industrial agreements and 
1. NZR 1942/335, S.4(2). 
2. ~Belshaw 11 Stabilization Policy in New Zealand 11 , in 
T.T,."R. Vol. Li_q_ nn.2q8 ff. 
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apprenticeship orders in order to give recognition to changes 
in the co st of living. 'rhis was qualified oy the inclusion 
of certain other criteria which had to be taken into account 
by the Court before it issued such a wage order, but it was 
enough to satisfy the Federation of' I,abou.r that the interests 
1 of its members would not be neglected • 
.After the war the polic;y- of' stabilization was continued 
in a modified form; and in the 11Vfolsh Report 11 of 1946 the 
Federation of IJS.bour lent its continuing support to the policy. 
Most of· the unions affiliated to the Federation lacked the 
bargaining power to negotiate wage rates above prevailing 
standards and the policy was a guarantee that they would 
receive equitable rates of wag;es through the application of 
established wage-fixing principles. A hand~ul of strong 
unions withheld support for this moderate policy, and by 1950 
the clash between the rival attitudes towards wage regulation. 
led to disruption within the ranks of the Federation. 
The ostensible cause of open dissension was a strike by 
the Auckland Carpenters Union in 1949 which led to the 
deregistration of the union by the Minister of Labour and the 
f'ormation by some of the carpenters involved in the dispute 
of a new union registered under the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act. The new 11arbitration 11 union was 
immediately accorded recognition by the Federation of Labour, 
a gesture which led the Waters'lLde · Workers Union to brGnd. the 
1. The Court also had to take into account economic and 
finahcial conditions affecting New Zealand trade and 
industry. 
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leaders of the Federation as "agents of the employing 
1 
class 11 • The national executive of the Federation called 
upon the union to withdraw allegations made about the role 
of the executive during the carpenters' strike, but the 
Waters.licie \Vorkers Union remained firm in its criticism. 
In the meantime relations between the union and the 
Federation were exacerbated by the question of' the inter-
national allegiance of the trade union movement in New Zealand. 
Until recently the Federation of Labour had been affiliated 
to the World Federation of Trade Unions, an organization 
formed largely on the initiative of the British Trades Union 
Congress in 1945 as an international experiment in uniting 
the organized workers of all countries in a world trade 
union movement. 
In the period of post-war disillusionment the organiza-
tion was bedevilled by diplomatic considerations, and in 
January 1949 the Trades Union Congress, the .American Congress 
of· Industrial Organizations and the Dutch .Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, all members of the Executive Bureau, with-
drew from the Federation alleging that it was it completely 
dominated by communist organizations which are themselves 
controlled by the Kremlin and the Cominf'orm 11 • 
2 
The 
1. In a letter from the NZWWU to the FOL dated 17 Mar 1949. 
Quoted by Scott, p.19. 
2. From a statement signed. by James Carey, CIO, Arthur 
Deakin, TUC, Evert Kuypers, NVU and Victor Tewson, TUC; 
reproduced in Free Trade Unions leave the W.F.T.U., p.2. 
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International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was 
established as a rival international organization and early 
in 1949 the Federation of Labour changed its af'f'iliatj_on and 
joined the new body. The Waters± de Workers Union refused 
to follow suit and at the annual conference of the union in 
December resolved to affiliate the watersiders to the 
maritime section of the World Federation of' Trade Unions. 
The annual conference of the Federation of Labour was 
scheduled for April 1950. It oecarne increasingly apparent 
that the points of dif'ference oetween the union and the 
national oody would oe the main topics on the agenda. 
On 19 January the executive of the union received two 
letters from the Federation. The first required the water-
siders to retract their 11 agents of the employing class" 
statement made twelve months earlier; the second requested 
a clear indication of the union's policy towards the World 
Federation.
1 
No apology was forthcoming; instead the union 
reiterated its international policy. The following week the 
national executive of the Federation of Laoour resolved that 
the union would be expelled from the national body as f'rom 
1 February 1950 unless the letter of March 1949 was withdrawn, 
a 11 suitable 11 apology given, and it changed its international 
1 
. 2 
a leg1ance. 
Despite this ultimatum, when the annual conference met 
in .April the expulsion issue was still not settled, but when 
opinion at'the conference appeared to turn against the 
1 • Scott p .19. 
2. Io id. 
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watersiders, they, together with delegates from the drivers, 
freezing workers, paper-mill workers, painters, rubber-
workers and general labourers staged a mass walkout. 1 
Other delegates joined the group the following day and a 
rival national trade union body, the Trades Union Congress 
was formed on 10 April. ? \ 
The year 1950 was the v~ of McCarthyism and 
at the time of' its formation the Trades Union Congress was 
commonly reputed to be a Communist 11 :front 11 organization. 
While the New Zealand Communist Party no doubt tried to exploit 
the existence of two rival trade union bodies, it did so with-
out conspicuous success. Five o:f the :forty-seven delegates 
and observers at the inaugural meeting of the Congress were, 
in :fact, members of the Communist Party, but no Party member 
was elected to any o:f the eight executive offices of the new 
2 body. The Trades Union Congress drew its support from a 
body of independent trade unionists united in their distrust 
of the wage-fixing policy shared by the Government and the 
Federation of Labour. It was not the outcome of the Marxist 
vredilections of a subversive political group. 
The Congress was f'ormed at a time when prices were 
rising more steeply than in recent years and the incomes of 
some groups within the economy were reaching record proportions, 
The index for food prices, which between January 1939 and 
December 1947 showed an average annual increase of 8.625 
points, in the period January 1948 to December 1950 reflected 
1. Minutes and Reports of Proceedings of 13th Annual Conferen< 
o:fFOL, p.21. 
2. R. M. Martin Compulsory Unionism in New Zealand, p.170. 
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an average increase of 37.25 points for each of the three 
1 
years. After 1946 export prices for butter, cheese, meat 
and wool also began to rise signif'icantly. In 1950 the value 
of both exports and imports was the highest on record, the 
total trade per head of mean population being valued at 
£177 17s. 7d., a figure much higher than any recorded 
. 1 2 previous y. The increase in the value of New Zealand's 
export trade after 1949 was largely accounted for bi higher 
returns for wool ~28.1 increase in twelve months); hides, 
pelts and skins (£3.3 million); cheese (£1.6 million); and 
frozen meat (£1.3 million); the 1950 returns representing an 
increase in the value of exports of 203 per cent over the 
average for the pre-war years 1936-1938. 3 
Because of these economic advances those unions possessing 
effective bargaining power came to regard the statutory wage-
fixing authorities as being too slow and unsympathetic to 
respond to their demands for substantial wage increases. 
They were prepared to attempt to secure their share of the 
increased prosperity of the country by the methods of direct 
negotiation and the tactics of militancy. 
rrhe Rising Tide of Mil;h_:t_anc;y 
The r•ecord of industrial stoppages in 1950 illustrates 
the way in which tension was mounting: throughout the year 
a total of 271,475 man-days were lost, at the time the 
largest annual loss recorded since statistics were first 
1. PWLS 1963, p.14. Base year 1955 (= 1,000). 
2. NZOYB 1951, XXIV. 
3. Ibid. 
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compiled in 1921.
1 
In January four hundred miners at Stockton were involved 
in a three-week stoppage after a prolonged dispute over the 
number of men allocated to work on the mine f'ace. 
2 
Between 
26 May and 1 ,June fifteen hundred miners at Huntly ceased 
work after they alleged that they had been given short pay 
at the Allison mine. In June a serious stoppage occurred on 
the Wellington waterfront when watersiders ceased work for 
almost two weeks to support their demands for increased rates 
of pay t·or handling lampblack on the 11 Myrtl ebank it. 3 In a 
demonstration against the removal of certain f'ood subsidies 
by the newly elected National Government workers from twelve 
coal mines, three i'reezing works, three hydro-electric works 
and fourteen ports took part in a general strike lasting two 
days at the end of June. 4 The following month more than a 
thousand Huntly miners were involved in a further stoppage 
after a dispute concerning the alleged wrongful dismissal of 
a trucker. Five thousand waterfront workers at sixteen 
ports throughout the country refused to work for ten days 
after 25 July over a dispute concerning the provision of 
reliefs for men going on tea-breaks. 
'.I'he waterfront industry figured in a f'urther stoppage 
two months later, again over the rates paid for handling 
lampblack. As a portent of things the Government declared 
a State of Emergency in pursuance of the Public Safety 
Conservation Act~ but before extraordinary measures were 
1. See below, p. 88. 
2. I,EG Vol. 1 , No. 1 , p .19. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
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employed to deal with the stoppage the watersiders and their 
employers agreed to conduct further negotiations in an effort 
to settle the dispute amicably. 
B3r December 1950 the line of demarcation between the 
conservative unions remaining in the Federation of Labour and 
the militants of· the Trades Union Congress was clearly defined, 
and a railway strike which occurred 
gave the two groups the opportunity to test their respective 
positions. Four unions were involved in the strike, the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the Railway •rradesmens 
Association, the Engine Drivers, Firemen and Cleaners Associa-
tion and the Railway Off'icers Institute. The previous April 
the f'our unions applied to the Railways Tribunal for increases 
in wages amounting to an average of £2 15s. Od. per week 
upon the basic rates for all railway workers. Many delays 
in the hearing of the dispute embittered the proceedings and 
by the time the Tribunal eventually announced its decision 
in December there were already calls for dir·ect action from 
the ranks of the railway unions. When it was at last for'th-
coming, the decision of the Railways Tribunal to increase the 
basic hourly rates of pay by one penny was regarded not only 
as inadequate but as insulting, and pressures for direct action 
1 
grew. 
'l'he strike began in Auckland af'ter a local secret ballot 
conducted in accordance with the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Amendment .Act 1947 resulted in 11 overwhelming11 
1. G. Broad 11 The Railway Strike: Sleepers .Awake 11 in He.I'..§. 
and Now 1951, No. 5, p.13. 
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support for strike action. 1 The two most powerful railway 
unions, the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants and the 
Railway Tradesmens Association immediately instigated direct 
action on a national scale. The Railway Officers Institute 
did not play any direct role in the strike, although it 
assisted by directing its members not to do any work normally 
carried out by the strikers. With the exception of the 
Auckland branch the Engine Drivers, Firemens and Cleaners 
Association also declined to participate directly in the 
stoppage. 
The strike was ended after the Minister of Labour 
intervened with a promise that the Railways Tribunal would 
be reconvened at the earliest possible date to deal with the 
wage dispute, but not before the two rival national workers' 
organizations had made their attitudes explicit. The Trades 
Union Congress offered to assist the railway workers in their 
strike, as did individual unions belonging to the Congress~ 
The Waterside Workers Union went so far as to threaten 
national strike action, and unions of drivers, miners and 
freezing workers were among those who profferred their 
assistance. The Federation of Labour spurned the use of 
direct action and refused to support the railway unions unless 
it was given full control of the wag~ dispute. 
The lines of battle were clearly drawn when the water-
front stoppage began two months later. 
1 • Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Defence and Retrenchment 
As it developed the waterfront crisis assumed the form 
, of a contest between the tactics of collective bargaining 
and the principles of conciliation and arbitration. In 
1932, when prices were falling rapidly, employers and farmers 
had combined to force the Government to remove the provision 
requiring the compulsory reference of unsettled disputes to 
arbitration in order to impose wage decreases at a time when 
the three-yearly system of awards protected wage earners 
against the full impact of economic depression. 1 The 
situation was reversed in 1951. The watersiders attempted 
to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the wage-fixing system 
in an effort to gain through direct tactics the wage increases 
which they I'egarded as their due in a period when prices and 
the incomes of other groups were rising in an unprecedented 
fashion. Faced with a stoppage which imperilled New Zealand's 
trade balance, the National Government pr-oceeded to put into 
effect emergency powers aimed at forcing the militants to 
conform to the principles of conciliation and arbitration. 
1 At this time there was no provision made for awards to 
be amended during their currency. They remained in force 
until the expiry of their full three year term. 
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The Waterfront Strike Emergency Reg_}1la tions 
The definitions of 11 strike 11 and 11 1ockout 11 had been 
widened in the Strike and Lockout Emergency Regulations 1939 
to include any concerted action to reduce the normal output 
in any industry. These regulations were repealed in 1949, 
but the definitions of direct action which they contained 
were incorporated in the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regula-
tions issued on 22 F'ebruary 1951. Under the new regulations 
a strike was deemed to be 
A. The act of any number of wo1"'kers who are or 
have been in the employment of the same 
employer or of different employers -
( i ) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
In discontinuing that employment, whether 
wholly or partially, and whether by 
refusing or failing to work overtime or 
otherwise; or 
In breaking their contracts of service; or 
In refusing or failing after any such 
discontinuance to resume or retur-n to 
their employment; or 
In refusing or failing to accept engage- .. 
ment for any work in which they are usually' 
employed. 
B. Any reduction in the normal output of workers in 
their employment. 
C. Any other transaction in the nature of a strike 
or combination, agreement, common understanding, 
or concerted action on the part of any workers, 
the said act, reduction, or any other transaction 
being intended or having the tendency ••• to 
interfere with the effective conduct of any 
industry or undertaking. 1 
If a strike was not ended within a period of time 
specified by the Minister of Labour it became a strike to 
which the regulations applied, or a 11 declared 11 strike. Every 
1 NZ _Regs, 1951/2Lj., S.2(1 ). 
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person committed an of'fence who was a party to a declared 
~ . 
strike, who encouraged the continuance of such a strike, or 
who printed or published any statement which was likely to 
11 encourage, procure, incite, aid or abet" a declared strike. 1 
If an;y member of a union was involved in a strike to 
which the regulations applied all officers of the particular 
union could be held responsible for the strike, unless they 
proved that they had counselled the members of the union to 
refrain f'rom strike action. 
2 
Union officials were liable 
to penal ti es not f'or doing something but for not doing any-
thing, and under the authority of the Public Safety Conservation 
Act these were set at a maximum term of imprisonment of three 
months or a maximum fine of £100.3 
Wide powers for enforcing the regulations were conferred 
upon the police force. Anyone deemed to be committing an 
of'fence under the regulations could lJe arrested without a 
warrant by any constable. The activities of members of the 
f'orce were not confined to of'f'ences actually committed. 
Police officers were given power to arrest persons for offences 
they had not yet committed. \/\/here picketing was concerned, 
for example, a constable was required merely to "form an 
opinion11 as to whether a person was likely to break the 
regulations by influencing the actioris of other people. It 
was immaterial whether or not the evidence produced at a 
later date proved that any person was likely to have been 
1 Ibid, S.L+. 
2 Ibid, S. 5. 
3 NZS 1932, No. 3, s.3(4). 
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influenced to participate in an unlawful strike by the actions 
1 
of the defendant. A similar provision applied to processions 
and meetings, whether they were held in a public place or 
elsewhere. If a member of the police force of' or above the 
rank of sergeant was satisfied that the holding of any 
procession or meeting was likely to be 11 injurious to the 
public safety or to the public interest 11 he could prohibit 
it immediately. 2 
By issuing the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations, 
the National Government sought to deal with the waterf·ront 
stoppage and any sympathy strikes which might eventuate by 
placing a ban on the tactics which made direct action effective. 
The restrictions on processions and meetings, together with 
the virtual prohibition of' picketing, curtailed the public 
activities of the workers involved in the stoppage, while the 
additional penalties provided under the regulations increased 
the threat of legal retribution. 
In this way the emergency regulations supplemented the 
powers for dealing with industrial strife conferred upon the 
Minister of Labour by the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, and enlarged the penalties and deterrents 
to be taken into account by unions contemplating prolonged 
strike action. 
Although at the time of' the waterf'ront stoppage many 
people were disturbed to discover how wide were the powers 
of the Government to suspend certain legal rights and processes 
1 NZ Regs, 19 51 /2Lj., S .14 ( 3). 
2 Ib i d, S • 1 6 ( 1 ) • 
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following the declaration of a State of Emergency, the 
principle of "regulated freedom 11 is deeply embedded in English 
constitutional law. The dec].sion of Judge Smith in H~rl2_ert 
v. Alls...QJ2. ( 1941) was one of several judgments which incorporated 
this principle: "The Legislature can, and in an emergency 
does, modify and suspend what are sometimes called the 
,, 
fundamental rights of' mankind. 11 1 
It is assumed, then, that the liberty of the individual 
is not an abstract entity. Parliament is supreme and can 
enact extraordinary measures which interfere with personal 
liberties, the good sense of the executive being the only 
safeguard of the rights of the individual. 
Even in normal times the law is by no means settled in 
regard to civil liberties. While citizens may suppose 
themselves to enjoy the right of meeting in public in a law-
ful manner for a lawful purpose this is not firmly established 
in law, although such meetings are normally held without 
question. The cases of Duncan 
2 
v. Jones (1936) and Burton 
v. Power (1940)3 illustrate this. In each instance the 
decision was that, as the police had a 11 reasonable apprehension" 
that bieaches of the peace might occur, both defendants were 
guilty of obstructing the police by holding meetings after 
being forbidden to do so, despite the f"act that no breach 
of the peace, actually occurred in either case. 
The Waterfr•ont Strike :Emergency Regulations contained 
1 NZLR, 1941, pp.370-4. 
2 KB~~1936, p.218. 
3 NZLR, 1940, p.305. 
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a number of analagous provisions by which power was given 
to the police to ban certain activities without specific 
authority so long as they acted in good faith and had a 
''reasonable apprehension" that s.n offence might have taken 
place if they had not intervened. Under the regulations a 
police of'ficer was, in fact, in the unassailable position of 
Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty: 11 When I use a word it means 
just what I choose it to mean - nei. ther more nor less. 11 
The Course of' the Waterfront Stoppage 
Following the publication of the Waterfront Strike 
Emergency Regulations the Government issued the ·waterfront 
Strike Notice 1951, calling upon the watersiders to resume 
work by 26 February. Failing this the stoppage was to be 
declared a strike within the meaning of the regulations. 
This ultimatum was rejected by the New Zealand Waterside 
Workers Union and the union was accordingly deregistered. 
Three days later, on·1 March, the Public Trustee was appointed 
receiver of the funds of the union. 
'rhe Waterside VJorkers Un:Lon managed for some months to 
maintain a de facto existence, but the way now lay open for 
the Minister of Labour to register new unions in :place of the 
defunct national body. 
'11he implementation of the· waterf·ront regulations involved 
several unions in sympathy strikes in support of the water-
siders. Under the authority of' the regulations servicemen 
were employed at the ports of' Wellington and ./\udO.and in the 
dischsrge of' perish.91Jle goods. By the end of" IV'arch mor-e than 
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three thousand service personnel were employed throughout 
the country in waterfront work and related duties. 1 The 
Wellington, Nelson, Marlborough and 'l1aranaki Freezing Workers 
Union had already become involved in the waterfront dispute 
when some union members ceased woPk in 1;r·otest against the 
introduction of the emergency regula.tj_ons. The employment 
of servicemen produced a further hostile reaction and by the 
middle of March killing stopped at twelve of the thirteen 
freezing works covered by the union.
2 As a result the 
registration of the union was cancelled on 27 March and a 
receiver appointed.3 
In a similar protest seamen walked off their ships at 
Wellington and Auckland after ser·vice personnel were employed 
there in unloading goods, despite the fact that F. P. Walsh 
in his capacity as president of the New Zealand Seamens 
Federation had p1•evio1rnly instructed union members to reme.in 
at work. 
'l'he stoppage continued to spread. Member·s of' the Golden 
Bay Cement Compi:my' s Employees Union and the Portland Cement 
Workers Union demonstrated their· support for the Waterside 
Workers Union, to which both unions were affiliated, by 
taking part in sympathy strlkes at the beginning of .April.~-
Both unions were accordingly deregister•ed on 3· April. The 
members of' the Wellington Drivers Union decj.ded by a series 
of ballots not to handle goods worked by servicemen and the 
1 AJHR, 1952, H 11, p.22. 
2 The freezing works at Waitara was the sole exception. 
3 AJHR, 1952, H 11, p.23. 
4 LEG, Vol. 2, No. 1, p$35. 
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registration of the union was also cancelled. Work also 
ceased at coalmines at Huntly, on the West Coast and in the 
1 King Country. For a time it appeared that the waterfront 
dispute woµld develop into a national stoppage of similar 
proportions to the British General Strike of 1926. 
What determined the actions of many unionists was not 
the merits of the watersiders' stand, but those provisions 
of the emergency regulations which were regarded as obnoxious. 
The.Government was in the embarrassing situation that the 
emergency powers introduced to deal with the vvaterfr>ont crisis 
had the temporary effect of extending rather than confining 
the scope of the original stoppage. However, when it became 
increasingly apparent that the Minister of Labour was not 
loath to use the power he possessed to deregister intransigent 
unions, direct participation in the stoppage, either in 
suppor·t of' the watersider·s or in protest against the emergency 
regulations, was limited to those uruon:::i who had already 
become involved in the dispute by the beginning of itpril. 
The ultimate penalty for a union taking part in the 
stoppage was legal proscription. Under the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act the Minister of Labour was 
given sole discretion to register new industrial unions of 
workers in place of those which he deregistered. At the 
'beginning of 4 951 the 1'Te\1v Zea_land VVaterside Worker1 s TJ11ion had 
nearly seven thousand members. Now the Minister proceeded 
to register local port unions in place of the national 
1 The various miners unions were not registered under the 
I C and A .Act. 
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organization. The policy of the Government was stated quite 
clearly: u Separate port unions, secret ballots, and open 
membership of' unions are planks in the Government 1 s policy 
from whic4 there can be no departure or variation. 111 
'.r.he first of a prol if era ti on of port unions came into 
being on 14 March. By the end of August a total of twenty-
six new waterfront unions had been registered, some with as 
2 
few as a dozen members. A similar policy was directed 
towards other unions involved in the stoppage, especially in 
the meat-freezing industry where new union.s covering se:para te 
freezing works were registered in the districts previously 
covered by the Wellington, Nelson, Marlborough and Taranaki 
Freezing Workers Award. The official functions of' the defunct 
unions were taken over by the new "arbi tration 11 unions. 
As the stoppage progressed continued efforts to reach a 
negotiated settlement failed, largely because of the ref·usal 
of the watersiders to accept unconditionally the principles 
of conciliation and arbitration. The Federation of Labour 
was only prepared to intervene if this acceptance was forth-
corning. At a special conference of the Federation held in 
March it was resolved that 
••• in negotiations there shall be no departure 
from the polic·y of the Federation of· Labour, namely 
conciliation and arbitration, and that representatives 
of the watersiders, miners, and freezing workers, 
or any other unions not affiliated to the Federation 
1 Press, 21 Apr 1951, p.7. 
2 'l'he-·Opotiki W.W.U. had 12 members; the 'l'okamaru Bay w.w.u. 
11. On the ot·her hand the Auckland Mari time Cargo-Workers 
Union had more than 1,700, and the Wellington W.W.u. more 
than 1,300. 
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of' Labour taking part L:in the stoppagy', shall 
f'irst state in writing that they accept this 
condition. Failing such assurance by the water-
siders, this conference has no option but to 
inform our affiliations that we cannot and will. 
not lend any f'urther support to this dispute.1 
As the or igibal dispute was largely a reflection of' the 
distrust of the watersiders in the system of coriciliation 
and arbitration, it was perhaps not to be expected that they 
would be amenable to attempts to settle the issue by the use 
of the procedures which were the cause of· the controversy. 
It became increasingly clear that the matters in dispute were 
not likely to be settled by negotiation and that the stoppage 
would be ended only with the complete victory of one side 
over the other. 
In a trial of strength all the advantages lay on the 
side of the employers, the Government and the Federation o:f 
Labour; the champions of conciliation and arbitration. 
Under the emergency regulations the funds of a 
deregistered union had to be surrendered into the hands o:f 
a receiver appointed by the Crown and it was an offence to 
contribute money or goods to persons who were parties to a 
declared strike.
2 
Union funds and sympathy contributions were virtually 
the only source of livelihood for the ~en on strike, and 
although unsuccessful at times the attempt to stem the flow 
of illicit funds increased the hardships facing the workers 
involved in the stoppage. Unofficial r-elief 01"ganizations 
1 Quoted in F.O.L. pa.mphlet S~he DeveloI?.!]l.eY!.:..t .. o:f 
.:the Trade Union movement in New Zealand, p .17. 
2 N~Reg1?., 1951/24, S.8. 
- 76 -
strived to provide vegetables, meat and other necessities 
for the families of the men on strike, but it became only a 
matter of time before many workers were compelled for 
financial reasons to seek alternative employment, or where 
that was impossible, to resume their old jobs and join the 
. 1 
new unions. 
M'ter the beginning of July there was a gradual resumption 
of work. 'rhe miners were the first group to return to work 
en masse, and less than a week later, on 6 July, the New 
Zealand Seamens Federation voted to return to normal duties. 
Aware that many workers had reached the point of' exhaustion 
through their participation in the stoppage, the National 
Strike Committee of unions involved in the crisis recommended 
three days later that unions still on strike should direct-
their members to return to work. 
Supremely confident of the conscious discipline 
of our ranks we call upon every individual member 
to return to work and hold up the banner of his 
union on the job. We call upon watersiders, 
seamen, miners, freezing workers, drivers and 
all other unionists to stand by their fellow 
workers in a positive fighting programme to 
overcome screening, hold conditions, and clean 
out scabbery root and branch. 
To this end the organizations in the combined 
unions resolve to join in a mutual assistance 
pact and pledge financial and moral support to 
any of the unions re~uiring it· to re-establish 
themselves. In unity we have fought, and in 
unity we return to our industri~s to fight again. 
In twelve months it will be .time to say whose 
is the victory! We are confident in our strength!
2 
In the meantime the only tangible reward for those who 
This was not always possible as a certain amount of 
discrimination wa.s practised against workers who had 
been involved in the stoppage. See Scott, pp.182-183. 
2 ·Q,uoted in Scott, p.198. 
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took part in the stoppage was a passport-sized 11 loyalty card 11 
issued by the New Zealand Waterside Workers Union (De-
registered), declaring that the bearer had ttsTOOD LOYAL RIGHT 
THROUGH - One Hundred and Fifty-one Days - February 15 to 
July 15, 1951 11 • 
The Ind~strial Conciliation and Arbitration lbJ:nendill.~:µ....L A~21 
After 1936, when the Act first made provision for the 
registration of national unions, some workers' unions had 
grovm in strength until they reached the stage of' development 
where they were regarded as a threat to the principles of 
orderly settlement. The waterf'ront crisis gave the Government 
the opportunity to destroy the concentrations of power held 
by these unions. 
The attempt of' the militants to break out of the confines 
of the conciliation and arbitration system failed in the 
face of' concerted action on the part of most employers and 
many trade union leaders. Both groups had a vested interest 
in protecting the principles of orderly negotiation, the 
employers because the system seemed to offer the best 
guarantee for industrial peace; the leaders of unions remaining 
within the Federation of Labour because they depended upon 
the techniques of conciliation and arbitration for securing 
minimum wage rates. Reinforcing this temporary alliance 
between the two groups the weight of the Government was 
brought down upon the dissenting unions by the introduction 
of the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations. 
With the passage through Parliament in 1951 of a new 
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amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
the National Government sought to consolidate the victory 
of the principles of orderly settlement over the tactics of 
collective bargaining. 
Introduced on 12 October., the amending bill in its 
original form was similar to a bill drawn up in 1950 with 
the aim of implementing the 1949 election pledge of the 
National Party to 11 abolish 11 compulsory unionism. In the 
interval between the first and second readings of the new 
bill the clause relating to the removal of State-imposed 
compulsory unionism was discarded and the proposed legislation 
was converted into an attempt to tighten the machinery'of 
the conciliation and arbitration system. 
The Minister of Labour stated that the purpose of the 
proposed legislation was to bring New Zealand's industrial 
laws up to date and to "ensure that unions had a full voice 
in the management of their own affairs 11 • 
1 
The bill was to 
strengthen what the Minister termed ttthe sound trade union 
movement ii by preventing union leaders from instigating strike 
action without the full support of union members. 
When contemplating strike action unions registered 
under the Act were already required to conduct secret ballots 
to ascertain whether union members supported the proposed 
t . 2 . ac ion. The Government aimed to make the secret ballot 
provisions work by increasing the penalties for non-compliance 
from a maximum fine of £20, and in the case of a conU.nuing 
1 NZP~ 1951, Vol. 295, p.18Lj .• 
2 NZS 1947, No. 15, S.8. 
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offence an additional f'ine of £5 per day; to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or a maximum fine 
of £100, as determined by a magistrate. 1 
These penalties were additional to those which could 
be exacted under other sections of the Act. Obligatory 
secret ballots, in the view of' the Government, would restrain 
hasty decisions, while the manner in which the ballots were 
to be taken, by postal votes not by the public decisions 
of union meetings, would restrict the actions of militant 
minorities. 
In its final form the 1951 .Amendment Act generally 
tightened up other penal provisions. The limited definitions 
of 11 striken and 11 lockout" were removed and in their place 
were inserted virtually the same definitions which had been 
incorporated in the Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations. 
Individuals who vvere :i;iar•ti es to strikes were now liable to 
a maximum penalty of £50, instead of' the previous penalty 
of' £1 O, while unions and employers who were involved in 
strikes and lockouts were now liable to a maximum fine of 
£500.
2 
.A new category was included whereby the members of the 
executive of any industrial union or association became 
liable to a fine of £250 if they took part in an unlawful 
strike. 3 This, together with the increased penalties for 
non-compliance with the secret ballot reg_uiremenLs, 
demonstrates the way in which union officials were being 
1 NZS 1951, No. 72, s.22(5). 
2 Ib i d, S • 1 24 ( 1 ) • 
3 Ibid. 
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made more open to prosecution under the Act. 
This was also apparent in another part of the new 
legislation, where it was provided that, if any members of 
an industrial union or association were parties to a strike, 
the union would be deemed to have instigated it unless the 
union executive could :furnish proof· that a prior secret ballot 
was taken or that every off'icer of the union had no knowledge 
of the imminence of the strike.
1 
Each officer of the union 
was liable to a penalty of £500 unless he could prove com-
pliance with this section. 
The new legislation was not concerned solely with 
punitive measures. Special attention was paid to the con-
sti tut ions, pr'ocedures and rules of unions I'egistered under 
the Act. Restrictions were placed on levies and subscriptions 
payable by union members, increases in dues being prohibited 
except in accordance with a resolution passed by a majority 
o:f the financial members of a union at a secret ballot. 
2 
Since the majority was deemed to be that of all members 
eligible to vote, not of the participants in the actual 
voting, alJstainers were in effect to be counted as negative 
voters, and this made it difficult for a union to bolster 
its funds by increasing the levies on union members. 
As an additional financial precaution all industrial 
unions and associations were now also obliged to furnish to 
their members on demand audited copies of' current income 
and expenditure in. order that members might be informed of 
1 Ibid, S.23(1 ). 
2 Ibid, S. 2L~. 
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the allocation of their subscriptions and other union monies~1 
In the view of the Minister of I,abour the innovations 
of the new amendment act were to provide 11 the full machinery 
for the democratic control of' unions" 
2 
Incr•eased penal ties 
for participation in unlawful strikes, the obligatory secret 
ballot provisions, and the controls placed upon union 
f'inances were intr·oduced to pr·event individuals in the trade 
union movement from gaining what the Government considered 
to be extraordinary personal influence and power, the 
argument 1) eing that if the Government cornpell ed people to 
join a trade union, as it did through the operation o:f 
compulsory unionism, it was responsible f'or limiting the 
powers that a trade union had over its members. 
I do not think that whatever legislation we may 
put upon the statute-book we will do away with 
strikes completely. I do not believe that for 
one minute, but we have made an attempt to give 
those who ar·e inside the trade union movement 
the right to make a decision for themselves as 
to what steps they should take.3 
'I'he new 1 egi slation emphasized that the rights enjoyed 
by unions registered under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act were granted only in exchange for the 
assumption by unions of certain responsibilities. The 
Government was in the :fortunate position of' being able to 
determine both. 
2 
3 
In keeping with proposals made by A.E.C. Hare in 1946. 
11 In view of' the fact that unionism is compulsory, the 
existing law in regard to financial control is almost 
totally unsatisfactory. 11 Hare, Report on Industrial 
Relations in New Zealand, p.201. 
NZPD-1951, Vol. 295;-p:B40. 
lb id' p • 84 1 • 
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The Police Offences Amendment_.!£t_till 
The revocation of the Strike and J..iockout Emergency 
Regulations in 1949 allowed unions remaining outside the 
jurisdiction of the Industrj.al Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act to instigate la.wful strikes providing that they fulfilled 
the requirements Gf the Labour Disputes Investigation Act~ 
Passecl in Decen1ber 1951 th.e I>olice Oflf'ences .Ainer1drne11t J~ct 
was formulated to seal off this area of potential turbulence 
by restricting the tactics which made direct action effective. 
'l'his was the year of the Korean war and the McCarthy 
investigations in the United States and since, in the eyes 
of the Attorney-General, "the sinister hand of communism vvas 
all too apparent in connection with the recent strike", in 
the face of this imminent peril a special definition of 
sedition was invoked in the new amendment. 
We are seeking to cope with a milder f'orm of 
activity. In the popular sense, sedition connotes 
some form of mob action ••• against established 
order ••• but the sort of activity we have in mind 
is something of a less concerted nature, not so 
much of' a demonstration - al though that is 
included - but more of an underground movement; 
a plot to overthrow established order while 
working ostensibly for some legitimate cause. 1 
In view of this the amending act was drawn up to arm 
the Government with additional powers to restore lavv and 
order in times of industrial crisis,' a comprehensive ban 
being placed on most of the tactics which might be employed 
by strikers. 
The picket line was one of the earliest techniques 
used by workers to ensure that a strike was effective. A 
1 Ibid. Vol. 2g6. nn.121'i-h. 
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line of pickets around the scene of a dispute was a tangible 
sign that a strike was i:r;i progress and a warning to any 
worker tempted to break the commandment ''Thou shalt not scabn. 
While picketing as such was not banned under the Police 
Offences .Amendment Act where, in the opinion of a police 
officer of or above the rank of sergeant, the presence of 
any person was 11 intend_ed or likely to influence a person to 
cease worlz or to be, or continue to be, a party to a strike'' 
the officer was empowered to direct the person to move away, 
f'ailure to comply with such instructions cons ti tu ting an 
1 offence under the Act. In effect, although the act of 
forming a picket line was not declared illega~ once it was 
formed it could be dispersed by the police. 
Where strikes were concerned it was also an offence 
for anyone to print, publish or distribute any matter that 
was likely to expose any persons to 11hatred and contempt 
amongst the :public 11 • 2 Any constable was empowered to seize 
any document, statement or any other written or printed 
matter in respect of which an off'ence under this heading 
was committed or was "reasonably suspected 11 by the constable 
to have been committed.3 Banners, placards, signs, badges 
and other insignia which contained words likely to 
facilitate the victimization of any persons or to cause any 
' ' 
substantial interference with the normal work conducted in 
a.ny trade or industry were also declared unlawful. 
In the case of a demonstration or procession which 
1 NZS 1951, No. '67, S.17. 
2 Ibid, S • 1 5 ( 2 ) • 
3 Ibid, S.6 . 
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might influence other persons to take part in a strike or 
to continue being parties to a strike, any constable might 
arrest without warrant any person found committing an 
offence against this part of the legislation or who was 
flreasonably suspected by the constable of having cormni tted, 
or having attempted to commit, or of ·!Jeing about to commit it 
1 
such an offence. 
'l'he onus of pr·oof in several :ps.rts of the Police 
O:ff'ences Amendment Act was thus shif'ted on to the person 
accused of commiting_an of'f'ence. Although it is one of' the 
fundamental maxims of British justice that the onus of proof 
in criminal cases rests with the Crown there are, in f'act, 
several exceptions, which really involve the 11 onus of 
exp~anation 11 • Certain cases of negligent driving, for 
example, involve the :principle res ipsa J_ogui t2-3£.: 11 the 
thing speaks for i tself' 11 • The Crown establishes certain 
facts fr'orn which guilty intention on the accused 
is inferred, and it is the responsibility of the defendant 
to :furnish an explanation which establishes his innocence 
or at least raises a doubt as to whether he is guilty. 
Commenting on the relevance of' this procedure to 
charges of sedition Lord-Justice Denning has said that 
••• the line where criticism ends and sedition 
begins is capable of infinite variations. This 
is where the practical genius of the common law 
shows itself. The line between criticism and 
sedition is drawn by a Jury who are independent 
of the party in power in the s~ate.2 
1 lb i d' s . 1 9 • 
2 Quoted by the Hon. W. Nash. NZPD 1951, Vol.296, p.1220. 
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Under the new amendment act offences were to be dealt 
with not by the legal process of trial by jury out by 
summary trial under a magistrate who could enforce a penalty 
of three months imprisonment. Torn between what it regarded 
as the imperative need to rebuild ef'fecti ve defences for 
the principles of conciliation and arbitration and the demands 
of the practical genius of the common law, the National 
Government prefer·red the speedier procedure of the summary 
trial. 
'--
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CHAPTER 5 
Industrial Stoppages 1952-61 
The degeneration of the waterfront dispute into open 
industrial warfare allowed the National Government to 
decapitate the militant section of the trade union 
movement and secure the defences of the conciliation and 
arbitration system. After 1951 those union leaders who 
were disposed to question the efficiency of the wage-
fixing machinery were seldom in a position to fall back 
on their own bargaining resources. Over the following 
decade the expression and resolution of industrial conflict 
in New Zealand took place within boundaries clearly 
defined by the actions of the Government during the 1951 
crisis. 
This does not mean that there were no signs of overt 
conflict over the period. Despite successive amendments 
of industrial legislation, the illicit stoppage has always 
played an important role in the industrial affairs of this 
country. However, the typical stoppage in New Zealand, 
although legally a strike, has little of the character of 
the classic strike weapon. Most industrial stoppages are 
demonstrations rather than declarations of war, the parties 
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involved usually being more concerned with solving the 
problems of which these episodes are a manifestation than 
with legal technicalities. 
Most industrial stoppages do not constitute a real 
threat to the principles of orderly settlement, and are 
indeed little more than preliminary skirmishes which serve 
to clear the ground for conciliation or arbitration. The 
attitude.of the National Government towards such occurrences 
was expressed by the Minister of Labour during the debate 
on the 1951 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Amendment Bill. The power of deregistration, he said 
••• would only be used where members of a union--
committed a continuing offence; it would only be 
used in extreme cases ••• 
In practice the position would likely be .•• that 
if a union voted the strike or stop work it would 
be the duty of the minister and the department to 
explore every avenue of conciliation and then for 
those points that could not be determined by 
conciliation to be referred to arbitration for 
settlement. That would be what would happen in 
practice.1 
Stoppages were condoned in so far as the grievances to 
which they drew attention were settled in ari orderly fashion 
through the channels of conciliation and arbitration. 
Acceptance stopped short of the recognition of the tactics 
of collective bargaining as in themselves legitimate methods 
for redressing grievances and securing concessions. 
1 NZPD' 1951, Vol. 295, p.839. 
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After a period of industrial strife of the magnitude 
of the 1951 crisis, however, it is to be expected that the 
number of stoppages would show a marked decline. A survey 
of the nature and incidence of industrial stoppages in the 
decade after 1951 indicates that militancy was at a low 
ebb, and that stoppages seldom exceeded the bounds of 
tolerance defined by the Minister of Labour. 
Working Days Lost 
The total number of working days lost annually through 
industrial stoppages, that is the duration in days of all 
stoppages multiplied by the number of workers involved, is 
one measure of the importance of overt conflict. 1 Statistics 
for this series have been compiled in New Zealand since 
1921 and are represented in the following table. 
Table 1. Industrial Stoppages in New Zealand: Working Days Lost 1921-
Year Days Lost Year Days Lost Year Days Lost Year Days Lost 
1921 119,208 1932 108,605 1943 'i 14, 687 1954 20,474 
1922 93,456 1933 65,099 1944 52~,,-602 1955 52,043 
1923 201,812 1934 10,393 1945 66,629 1956 23,870 
1924 89' 105 1935 18,563 1946 30,393 1957 28,186 
1925 74,552 1936 16,980 1))47 102,725 1958 18,788 
1926 . 47,811 ·.•; 1937 29,916 1948 93,464 1959 29,651 
. 
1927 12,485 1938 35,456 1949 218,172 1960 35,683 
1928 21,997 1939 53,801 1950 271,475 1961 38,185 
1929 25,889 1940 28,097 1951 1,157,390 1962 93,157 
1930 31,669 1941 26,237 1952 28,123 1963 54,490 
' 1931 48,486 1942 51'189 1953 19,291 
Source: PWLS 1963, p.64. 
"· 1 In calculating the number of days lost it is assumed 
that work would have been continuous if no stoppages 
had taken place. 
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Like other forms of social conflict, industrial 
conflict tends to become manifest in cycles, an 
accumulation of crises resulting in peak years of strike 
activity. This is evident between 1947 and 1951 where the 
figures for working days lost reach record proportions, 
then show an abrupt decline over the next decade. Not 
until the end of 1951 was there a stoppage of any real 
consequence in the months following the end of the water-
front dispute. Beginning on 30 October 1952, this stoppage 
affected maintenance tradesmen in the meat freezing 
industry and resulted in the loss of 13, 936 working days, 
a figure which Bxceeded the loss due to all other stoppages 
in the previous twelve months. 1 
New Zealand's record in the decade following the end 
of the waterfront stoppage compares most favourably with 
the experience of other countries over the period. 
Table 2. Working Days Lost Fer 1,000 Wage and Salary Earners: 
International Examples 1952-612 
Year Aust. U.K. U . .S.A, Canada N. Z. 
1952 450 88 1,223 759 48 
1953 410 107 569 345 32 
1954 339 119 466 386 33 
1955 369 181 563 472 82 
1956 403 98 639 295 37 
1957 226 395 316 367 42 
1958 152 162 473 639 27 
1959 124 246 1,293 486 43 
1960 238 140 351 153 50 
1961 200 140 301 274 52 
1 1 1 Source: LEG Vol 13, No. 2, p.27 LEG, Vol. 3, No. , p.3 • 
2 Because "wage and salary earners" are defined according 
to various national criteria the table is the basis 
for no more than broad comparisons. 
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Table 2 demonstrates that after 1951 New Zealand's record 
of days lost to industry through stoppages is easily the 
best of the five countries depicted in the survey. This 
is largely a reflection of the weakened state of militant 
unionism in New Zealand and the unwillingness of union 
leaders to precipitate large-scale stoppages which might 
become subject to the full powers of the Minister of 
Labour. 
Number and Duration 
The statistics for total working days lost imply 
that some years are marked by endemic restlessness 
throughout all industries when, in fact, the bulk of the 
aggregate figure for days lost is accounted for by 
relatively few protracted disputes in a handful of industries. 
In 1951, for example, there were 109 individual stoppages, 
by no means a remarkable number when compared with the 
figures for previous years, yet more than a million 
working days were lost as a result of the waterfront 
stoppage and allied strikes. Table 3 indicates the 
prevalence of separate stoppages and the numbe.r of days 
elapsing between the advent of stoppages and the 
resumption of normal work, and reveals that the relative 
length of stoppages, rather than the total number, is the 
most important of the two variables for determining the 
total number of days lost. 
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Table 3. Ind.ustrial Stoppages: Number and Duration 1945-63 
Year Total Total Average 
Stoppages Duration(1) Duration<
2 ) 
1947 134 
1948 101 
'i949 -123 
1950 129 
1951 109 
1952 50 
1953 73 
1954 61 
1955 65 
1956 50 
1957 51 
1958 49 
1959 73 
1960 60 
1961 7'1 
1962 96 
1963 60 
~ 
(1) To nearest full day 
(2) In days 
834 6.22 
608 6.02 
672 5.46 
567 4.40 
3,464 31.78 
108 2 .16 
145 1.99 
136 2.23 
211 3.25 
390 7,.80 
165 3.24 
152 3.10 
229 3.14 
344 5e73 
353 4.96 
498 5.18 
366 6.09 
Source: FWLS 1963, p.64. 
- 92 -
It will be seen that while the total number of 
stoppages is subject to cyclical fluctuations, there being 
substantially fewer stoppages in the years immediately 
after 1951, the downward trend is more marked in the figures 
for both the total and average duration of stoppages. 
Except for 1956 stoppages in the period 1952 to 1959 were 
significantly shorter than for the five years after 1947, 
an average of 3.36 days against an average of 10.77 days. 
Both the number and length of stoppages show a tendency 
to increase after 1959, but the pattern for the years 
following the waterfront crisis is quite clear: stoppages 
were typically short-term affairs of no more than a few 
days duration and for that reason subject to the normal······ 
machinery of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act rather than to the powers conferred upon the Minister 
of Labour. 
An analysis of the relative longevity of stoppages 
between 1952 and 1959 confirms this pattern. Over the 
period stoppages lasting less than one day accounted for 
sixty per cent of the total number, those lasting between 
one and three days, twenty-four per cent, ·and the remainder 
only fifteen per cent. 1 
Workers Involved 
A survey of the number of workers involved annually in 
stoppages reveals the extent of support for such stoppages, 
1 PWLS 1963, p.66. 
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and by indicating the number of actual participants 
further clarifies the figures for total working days lost. 
In Table 4 the number of workers involved annually in 
stoppages is compared with the annual totals of all wage 
and salary earners. 
Table 4. Industrial Stoppages: Workers Involved 1947-631 
Year Workers Average Days Total Wage Workers Involved 
Involved lost per and salary as Percentage of 
Worker earners Total Labour Force 
(000) 
1947 26,970 3.81 _545.5 4.94 
-
1948 28,494 3.28 556.3 5.12 
1949 61,536 3.55 568.1 10.83 
1950 91,492 2.97 574.9 15.91 
1951 36,878 31.38 583.2 6.33 
1952 16,297 1.73 592.2 2.76 
1953 22, 175 0.87 609.4 3.64 
1954 16,153 1.27 623. 6 2.59 
1955 20,224 2.57 639.6 3.16 
1956 13/579 1.76 652.9 2.08 
1957 15,545 1. 81 670.2 2.~3 
1958 13,709 1. 37 - 693.0 1.99 
1959 18,762 1. 58 699.4 2.70 
1960 14,305 2.49 725.9 2.00 
1961 16' 626 2.30 753.0 2.27 
-
1962 39,921 2.33 766.7 5.35 
1963 14,911' 3.65 793 •. 9 1.88 
Sources: NZOYB, passim. 
PWLS 1963, p.64. 
1 These are aggregate figures, since it is often impossible 
to ascertain exactly how many separate individuals were 
involved in stoppages, especially when several stoppages 
occurred in the same industry. 
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In this series the year 1951 again appears as a 
dividing line, considerably fewer workers being involved 
in· industrial stoppages after 1951 than in the preceding 
years. As might be expected the average number of days 
lost per worker also shows an appreciable declilile after 1951. 
Only in 1963 did it exceed three days. 
The percentages of the total numbers of wage and 
salary· earners involved annually in stoppages seems to 
indicate that over the period militancy was a relatively 
restricted phenomenon. In 1951 less than seven per cent of 
the labour force took part in the waterfront stoppage and 
all other strikes throughout the year, and only in two years, 
1949 and 1950 did stoppages involve more than this percentage. 
This is even more revealing when it is realised that 
the figures for these two years are somewhat misleading, for 
in the months/before the outbreak of the waterfront crisis 
there were several stoppages in the same undertakings. 
Since the method of computation takes account only of the 
aggregate numbers of workers involved in all stoppages, the 
actual proportion of the labour force taking part was 
probably much lower. This inflation enters into the figures 
for most years, but it appears to be more pronounced in the 
two years mentioned. Ta~ing this into. account, it seems 
that overt industrial conflict in New Zealand is limited' 
to a comparatively small proportion of the labour force. 
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Stoppages in Different Industries 
The general series of statistics relating to industrial 
stoppages suggest that militancy is a restricted 
phenomenon, even in "bad" years when large numbers of 
working days are lost through stoppages. In 1951 
ap~roximately six per cent of the total labour force 
accounted for the loss of more than a million man-days and 
the great majority of the workers taking part in stoppages 
throughout the year were employed in the three industries 
of waterfront work, coal mining and meat-free~.ing, 
stoppages in all other industries resulting in the loss of 
1 fewer than 60,000 working days. The records of these 
three industries in the years before 1951, recorded in Table 
5, illustrate clearly the limited nature of militancy over 
the period. 
1 Apart from the waterfront stoppage and allied strikes, 
all other stoppages during the year caused the loss of 
only 47,778 man-days. 
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Table 5. Working Days Lost: Comparative Contributions of the 
Waterfront, Coal Mining and Meat-freezing .Industries 1937-51. 1 
No. of Days Lost % of Days Lost in all Industries j 
Water- Meat 
I 
Year Water- Meat Coal Coal Combined 
front Freezing Mining front Freezing Mining % 
1937 7,683 4,292 11,774 26 14 39 79 
1938 12,265 4,874 13,553 35 14 39 88 
1939 20,864 1,993 21 '739 39 4 40 83 
1940 7,489 725 11,393 27 3 40 70 
1941 161 6,984 11,569 1 27 44 72 
1942 929 25,420 24,630 2 50 48 100 
1943 477 566 9, 105 3 4 62 69 
1944 24,452 5,753 18,470 47 11 35 93 
1945 11,798 7,782 25,253 18 12 38 68 
1946 14,483 4,719 9,826 48 15 32 95 
1947 14,871 28,585 25,408 14 28 25 67 
1948 29,302 5,792 33,214 31 6 36 73 
1949 66,036 .">3.1287 32,994 30 2 15 47 
1950 102,224 3,947 53,351 38 1 20 59. 
1951 670,934 102,213 328,444 58 9 28 95 
SOURCE: LEG Vol IV, No.2, p.46. 
Vol V, No.2, p.29. 
1 For reasons of convenience, the allied industries of 
shipping and cargo-working are combined under the 
heading 11 the waterfront industry". 
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Between '1937 and '195'1 the three industries together 
consistently accounted for more than two thirds of the 
working days lost each year. In '1942 they contributed 
all the days lost through stoppages. Only in '1949 did 
the three together account for less than half the annual 
total. 
Certainjindustries, then, appear to be particularly 
susceptible to industrial stoppages and in this New 
Eealand's experience appears to agree with that of other 
countries. In an inter-industry survey of strikes in 
eleven countries conducted in '1953, C. Kerr and A. Siegal 
found a large measure of international uniformity in strike 
patterns. ·The mining and waterfront industries were among 
the industries with the "highest propensity to strike", 
while industries processing food were ranked in the 
'1 
"medium propensity to strike" category. The significant 
contribution to working days lo.st of the meat freezing 
industry in New Zealand, an exception to the international 
trend, is a reflection of the unique importance of the 
industry in this;country. 
Part of the explanation for the disproportionate 
contribution of these industries to the statistics of 
'1 C. Kerr and A. Siegal "The Interindustry Propensity to 
Strike - an International Comparison" in Industrial 
Conflict, p.'190. 
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industrial stoppages lies in the nature of the work 
performed. 1 Waterfront work, coal mining and meat-freezing 
depend on large, closely concentrated forces of 
comparatively unskilled workers who tend to have a strong 
allegiance to the unions in which they are organised. The 
work undertaken is often of a dangerous and obnoxious 
character and there are frequent disputes concerning claims 
for special rates of pay for handling certain types of work. 
Small matters of complaint peculiar to each of these 
industries result in many local stoppages during the normal 
_ course of work, work being discontinued pending the 
sat;tsfactory settlement of grievances. The unions organizing 
within these industries have a long militant tradition 
extending back to the maritime strike of 1890 and as the 
history of the 1951 crisis illustrates, they are not loath 
to attempt to secure concessions by the use of direct tactics. 
The attempt of some union leaders to convert local 
union strength in a few strategic industries into a 
concerted bargaining force failed in 1951 under 'the combined 
onslought of the Government, the employers and the Federation 
of Labour, but local stoppages in ttese industries still 
accounted for a significant proportion of the annual totals 
of working days lost through industrial stoppages in the 
decade after 1951. 
1 See above, pp.38 ff. 
Table 6. Working Days Lost: En Interlndustry Comparison 1952-631 
Industry 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1-962 1963 Total ' 
Meat 
Freezing 14,739 250 2,778 1 ,942 _9,523 6,432 4,487 12,857 18,924 2G,738 39,692 31,909 164,271 
Water.front 2,585 188 522 1,450 634 2, 111 2,509 4,001 1,134 729 3,210 7, 104 26, 177 
lfil>al-mining 7,827 9,937 5,766 10,337 1'910 3, 150 2,624 4,396 3,349 3,951 3,345 3,367 59,959 
!Building 
& Const. 617 3,252 9,974 33,102 6,226 14,285 7,719 3,952 101 7,407 1'766 5,703 94,058 
Engineering - 3,525 - 73 - - 120 845 1 ,856 802 2,409 2,574 12,204 
-l 
I 
~lp & Paper - - - - 2,514 ·550 1'150 2,959 6,363 - - - 13,536 
:. l·-
;/ubber 219 - 544 4,032 1, 775 - - - ' 703 709 223 994 9, 199 ' -~ 
I 
I ';' x~, -
, Railways -
I-
- - - - - - - - 1'188 - 30,920 - 32, 1108 
-
'Logging - - - - 450 - - - - - - 1,962 2,412 
Road 
331 
.. 
Transp0rt 2, 100 193 46G 33 50 - - - - - - 2#-869 
Fertili&er - - - 143 - - - - 249 208 9,901 - 10,501 I 
Others 36 1,946 857 504 805 1,608 179 641 1 ,816 3,641 1 ,331 887 14,251 
Total 28,123 19,291 20,474 52,043 23,870 28, 186 18, 788 29,651 35,683 38,185 93, 157 54,490 441 ,941 
1 PWLS p767. 
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The annual aggregates for working days lost through 
stoppages in all industries were much lower after 1951 than 
for the preceding period, but Table 6 shows that, as in 
previous years, a handful of industries were responsible 
for the bulk of the annuaL. totals. The industries of 
building and construction, waterfront work, coal mining and 
meat-freezing contributed almost eighty per cent of all 
working days lost between 1952 and 1963 and the last three, 
those most involved in the waterfront; crisis, still 
accounted for more than half the aggregate total. 
This seems to indicate that while various factors 
influenced the level of militancy, the most obvious after 
1951 being the weakened state of the militant unions, 
I 
stoppages followed a predictable pattern in that they were 
confined mainly to a few industries, most industries 
remaining peaceful for long periods or experiencing only 
infrequent stoppages. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The Tramways"_Dispute: A Case Study 
After 1951, in the absence of any subsequent attacks 
' 
on the system for regulating industrial conflict in New 
Zealand, the techniques of conciliation and arbitration 
proved to be highly efficient in dealing with most industrial 
disputes. Of all disputes referred to Oouncils of 
Conciliati2n in accordance with the requirements of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, in the decade 
after~1951 nearly seventy per cent were entirely settled 
without the intervention of the Court of Arbitrartion.1 
Few disputes resulted in stoppages of work and the great 
bulk of those which did eventuate were confined to a 
handful of indus.tries, most industries functioning for 
long periods without experiencing any disruption of normal 
work. 
The incidence of industrial stoppages was remarkably 
low, both in comparison with the experience of previous 
years and with the records of other ·countries over the same 
period. 2 Industrial conflict did not cease after the end 
1 AJHR passim. 
2 See above pp.89. 
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of the waterfront stoppage, but it was institutionalized 
to a greater degree than hitherto, grievances and demands 
being formulated and resolved in an orde.rly fashion which 
obscured most visible signs of discord. 
The Tramways Dispute, really a series of related 
disputes occurring over a number of years, provides an 
insight into the day to day operation of the conciliation 
and arbitration system, and illustrates the extent to 
which the system largely determines not only the way in 
which conflict is resolved but also the way in which it 
becomes articulated. 
The Rigg Deci.sion: A New Sphere of Negotiation 
Before September 1947 the wages and conditions of work 
for tramway employees in New Zealand were laid down in a 
number of separate local documents, there being no national 
award or agreement for the public transport industry. 
In that month A.B. Rigg, the Conciliation Commissioner 
for Wellington, issued the decision of an Emergency Disputes 
Committee 9onvened to settle the matter then in dispute 
between the New Zealand Tramways At.llhorities Employees 
Industrial Union of Workers and the authorities employing 
members of the union. For the first time wages and certain 
other matters were settled on a national basis, but other 
controversial issuei relating to shift work, broken-shifts, 
signing on and off and "call-backs" and "call-forwards" 
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were left to be negotiated at a local level between the 
individual employers and the branches of the union 
concerned. 
1 
This decision, henceforth known as the Rigg Decision, 
was registered in the Court of Arbitration as an industrial 
agreement with a currency of nine months. It was thus an 
interim arrangement enabling both sides to work out their 
respective bargaining positions in the light of what was a 
new type of negotiation. 
While it was an undoubted. _advantage if or the workers in 
the industry to have their wages determined through n~tional 
negotiations, removing as it did the necessity for them to 
conduct several sets of local negotiations in order to 
establish a national uniformity of wage rates, the employing 
authorities were disturbed by a decision which they regarded 
as establishing an unfortunate precedent. They regarded the. 
matters concerning the conditions of work for tramway 
employees as amenable to different solutions at a local level, 
but the Rigg Decision was accompanied by the likelihood that 
1 These terms refer to working arrangements peculiar to the 
public transport industry. "Broken-shifts 11 are shifts 
where the ordinary hours of work; normally eight per day, 
are spread over a period of twelve or more hours, with 
an intervening.interval of free time. 11 Signing on and 
off 11 refers to the times for.the commencement and 
completion of duties. 11 Call backs 11 and 11 call forwards" 
are arrangements whereby overti1,me shifts are worked in a 
fixed ratio to the number of ordinary shifts. 
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these matters would all come within the scope of future 
national award negotiations. This was regarded by the 
employers as a threat to their best interests. 
The full implications of the decision were brought 
out early in the new year when, following an appeal by the 
Tramway Employees Union, a new Emergency Disputes Committee 
was set up to determine the interpretation and application 
of the new industrial agreement.6haired by D.J. Dalglish, 
Deputy-Judge of the Court of Arbitration, the Comniittee 
eventually decided that the parties be advised to institute 
/-
appropriate proceedings.under the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act for the purpose of drawing up a national 
awarde 1 
Henceforward the contest between the workers and their 
employers was focussed on the contents of the new award, each 
side attempting to gain concessions at subsequent conciliation 
hearings wli~n the award expired. 
The New Zealand Tramwa;y: Authorities Employees Award 
The new award was filed on 28 October 1949. Because 
agreement was not forthcoming at the preliminary conciliation 
hearings the document represented a compromise imposed by 
the Court of Arbitration rather than one agreed to by the 
parties concerned. 
By virtue of the "blanket clause" of the Act it was 
specified that the terms, conditions and provisions of the 
1 l2!, Vol. 48, p.767. 
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award were binding upon all members of the workers' union 
1 
and uppn all their employers. The employing authorities 
concerned were the Auckland Transport Board, the New 
Plymouth City Corporation, the Wanganui City Corporation, 
the Christchurch Tramway Board, the Wellington City 
Corporation, the Dunedin City Corporation and the Invercargill 
City Corporation, all members of the New Zealand Tramways 
and Public Passenger Transport Authorities Industrial 
Union of Employers. 
The new award laid down wage rates and provisions 
~ 
relating to overtime, hours of work and other conditions on 
a national basis, but as in the Rigg decision concessions 
were made to the local differences in public transport 
operation in that certain matters, particularly those 
concerning broken shifts, "call-backs" and "call=forwards" 
were dealt with under individual headings for each city. 
The section on industrial disputes contained the stock 
clause incorporated in most awards: 
The essence of this award is that the work of the 
employer shall proceed in the customary manner and 
shall not ·on any account whatsoever be impeded. If 
amy dispute or difference shall arise between the 
parties boun<;l by this award and be not settled by 
.mutual agreement, every such dispute or difference 
shall .be referred to a committee composed of three 
representatives of each side, together with an 
independent chairman to be mutually agreed upon, or, 
in default of agreement, to be the Conciliation 
Commissioner for the district or a person appointed 
by him.2 
1 BA, Vol. 49, p.3201. 
2 Ibid, pp.3240-1. 
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No disputes of any consequence followed upon the 
announcement of the Tramway Employees Award, but the, award 
became the subject of a series of judicial conte~ts 
throughout 1950, the Court of Arbitration being eventually 
calle~ upon to declare its interpretation of certain 
controversial sections. 
In November 1951 a new award, substantially the same 
as the old was issued by the Court after the expiry of the 
1949 document, and this also involved the Court of 
Arbitration in an interpretative role. 
These judicial skirmishes were only preliminary to the 
real fray, since the basic problems concerning wage rates 
and conditions of employment had not yet been settled to 
the satisfaction of either of the contending parties. All 
that the Rigg Decision and the two national awards had 
established was a new arena of negotiation, where certain 
matters relating to tramway employment were discussed at a 
national level. This involved a concentration of power 
into the hands of the rival national unions, and both had 
their own ideas as to what use could be made of this new 
situation. 
Award Negotiations in 192.2_ 
The date of expiry of the 1951 award was 30 May 1953. 
To allow the employers time to prepare a united front, a 
meeting of the Management Committee of the employers' union 
was held in December 1952, and it was decided that steps be 
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taken to file claims for a new award. 1 
On 11 February 1953, an application on behalf of the 
employing authorities, requesting that a Council of 
Conciliation be convened to hear the dispute, was accordingly 
lodged with the Clerk of Awards. Attached was a schedule 
setting out the employers claims. The following month the 
national employees union filed counter claims, and a 
conciliation hearing was arranged to discuss the opposed 
claims. 
The employers' schedule contained proposed changes to 
~the old award, relating to shift work, "broken-shifts", 
days off, "call-backs" and "call-forwards". In reply the 
workers claimed a wage increase of 1~d per hour, and in 
addition requested that alterations in their interest be 
made to the clauses dealing with shift-work, broken shifts, 
"call-backs" and 11 call-forwards", holidays and uniforms. 
The rival claims thus reflected the measure of 
disagreement which separated the contending parties. The 
employi~g authorities, unlike most businessmen, could not 
voluntarily increase production in order to absorb wage 
rises, nor w:Bm-.e" they able to increase public transport 
fares indefinitely and still carry out their function of 
providing a public service. They were, however, prepared 
to increase the rates of pay paid to tramway employees in 
response to any concessions made by the workers which would 
1 A. Cooper (Secretary PPTA) to J.F. Fardell (General 
Manager OTB), Fardell File, 12 Dec. 1952. 
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iNcrease the efficiency of bus operation. For their part 
the employees regarded any increase in wages not as a 
reward for assisting the public transport industry to 
become more efficient but as an overdue increment enabling 
their wages to keep abreast of current increases in the cost 
f /l, . 0 lVlng. 
The workers agreed to proceed with the Conciliation 
hearing on 25 March, all.in order to discuss the implications 
of the matters in dispute R.E. Dawson, the Secretary of the 
employers' union arranged a further meeting of the employers 
assessors for 24 March. 1 Here it was affirmed that any 
increase in wage rates would be granted only in return for 
significant concessions made by the employees' union. 
Next day the hearing began at Wellington under the 
chairmanship of the local Conciliation Commissioner, 
H .. M. Hooper. During the first three days of the sitting 
only three clauses of the proposed award, dealing with 
wages, "broken-shifts" and driver qualifications were 
discussed. 2 
The proceedings reached a stalemate on the first day 
and an adjournment was called by the Commissioner. On the 
second day little progress was made ,regarding wages. The 
employers offered an increase of 1d per hour subject to an 
agreement by·the workers to work more broken shifts. 
1 Fardell File, memorandum to members of PPTA, 12 Mar 1953. 
2 OTB Works and Transport Minutes, 30 Mar 1953, P·· 2. 
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In effect this would reduce the number of hours being 
worked at overtime rates of pay, and the representatives of 
.the workers rejected the offer and restated their claim for 
an increase of 1~d per hour with no conditions to be 
attached. Later in the day this was reduced to a claim of 
1 / 
14d. 
The employers' assessors adjourned to consider the 
matter, and on return informed the union that they could not 
agree to the 1~d increase, but that they reaffirmed their 
previous offer of 1d an hour if the broken shift and 
• . ·1 1 qualifications clauses were settled in ±:hed,il?c favour .. 
With no immediate likelihhod of the stalemate being 
broken, the Conciliation Commissioner adjourned the hearing 
for one month to allow the parties to reconsider their 
positions. At a meeting held on 23 April both sides remained 
adamant, and the Commissioner subsequently gave notice that 
the dispute had been referred to the Court of Arbitration. 
In keeping with the spirit of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act, that the technique of arbitration was 
not to be employed until all possible avenues of conciliation 
had been explored, the Court declined jurisdiction of the 
dispute on the grounds that insufficient progress had been 
made at the conciliation hearings. The .dispute was 
accordingly referred back to the Conciliation Commissioner 
and the Council resumed its hearing on 25 June. 
1 Ibid. 
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Before the new hearing began there appeared to be 
oh~y two possible alternatives: that the existing Award be 
renewed in its entirety, without any alteration in either 
wages or conditions, for a further period of twelve months; 
1 
or that both parties agree to a '14d an hour increase in the 
basic hourly rate subject to alterations in favour of the 
employers in 'other clauses. 
The possibility of compromise being reached on the 
second of these alternatives diminished when a few days 
before the hearing was scheduled to begin it was announced 
that the Federation of Labour was pressing for another 
general wage order. Faced with the prospects of an unforseen 
general wage increase the employers. pref erred to accept the 
disadvantages of the old awar·d by perpetuating the stalE;imate 
at the level of national negotiations. 
The Return to Local Negotiations 
The hearing was adjourned sine die on 26 June, but not 
before the possibility of new developments begari. to appear • 
. In an attempt to obtain a partial settlement it~ wasi 
agreed that discussions take place between the local 
employing authorities and the local union branches. This 
was a return to the local bargaining situation existing 
before the Rigg Decision of 1947. 
While local negotiations undoubtedly would have 
assisted the employing authorities by allowing them to take 
into account local problems concerning public transport 
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operation in each city, the workers were not similarly 
inclined to favour the.proposed shift in the sphere. of 
negotiations. At a meeting of the Auckland branch of the 
Tramway~E~ployees Union held some weeks after the adjournment 
of the·conciliation council it was decided that 
••• after,_c·onside.ring the manager's letter containing 
the Board's· assessors' nrouosal that a ratio of 
70% broken shifts to straight shifts be agreed to · 
in Auckland, this meeting resolves that in view 
of the apparent failure to reach an agreement on 
the award nationally in order to obtain the 1~d 
per hour increas.e ·in return for an increased 
number of shifts, the Board's conditional offer 
be declined.1 . 
Local negotiations in Christchurch produced the same 
result. The local branch of the Tramway Employees» Union 
was offered a change in the ratio of straight shifts to 
1 
broken shifts in return for an increase of 14d an hour for 
this facility. This offer was refused, the local executive 
reiterating that a wage increase should be granted not for 
the working of extra broken shifts but in order to bring 
the wages of tramway employees in line with award rates 
currently being laid down in other industries by the Court 
of Arbitration. 
For some months there was no change in the stalemate, 
the old award remaining in force. Then on 14 March 1955 
the Christuvhh Transport Board received a deputation of 
tramway employees asking that the Board consider a new claim 
1 Fardell to C. Cooch (Acting Secretary of PPTA),'Fardell 
·File, 19 Aug 1953. 
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for increased rates of pay on the grounds that all employees 
of the Wellington City Corporation had recently been granted 
an unconditional incirroos:e of 11d per hour. Now the tables 
2 
were turned. The Board stated that it was unwilling to 
consider any change in the award except on a national scale. 1 
The Exploratory Committee 
Except in Wellington the change in the sphere of 
negotiations accomplished little for either side. Both the 
employers and the workers attempted to prosecute their own 
interest through whichever medium suited them at the time. 
Neither was prepared to make significant concessions in 
order to reach a realistic compromise between the rival 
claims for increased wages and increased efficiency. 
It was at this point that the workers suggested the 
idea of an "exploratory committee", an ex officio 
"conciliation council" which would have the advantage of-
bringing both sides together informally at a national level. 
In the light of the further attempts at negotiation which 
had been made since it was last referred to the arbitration, 
the Court could not decline jurisdiction of the Tramways 
Dmspute indefinitely. The aim of the workers in prop0sj;,rig 
the exploratory committee was to give the parties a last 
chance to settle the matters in dispute by negotiation;;. 
1 Fardell File, extract from OTB Works and Transport 
minutes, 14 Mar 1955. 
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••• ·we are conv.inced it is unfair ;"to ask the 
Court to grasp all the intricacies of our Award in· 
a couple of days and then give a decision that 
will solve problems that your union and mine have 
been grappling with for months.1 
The employing authorities viewed the proposal of the 
ad hoc committee in a different light. The Court of 
Arbitration had recently ilu,ar.ea:sed the basic weekly wage 
of all workers bound by awards and agreements by thirteen 
per cent on the first £12. This ;had the effect of increasing 
the basic forty-hour wage, but not the rate for hours of 
overtime worked. The aim of the.workers was to negotiate 
an all-inclusive increase in their wages which ·would 
raise overtime rates as well as the basic rate. For their 
part the employers stood to gain more at this stage from an 
award of the Court than from a negotiated settlement, since 
the award would incorporate the general order only in the 
first £12, and not in subsequent wage increments. 
Despite their preference, after the breakdown of local 
negotiations, for the technique of arbitration the employers 
agreed to take part in the proposed meeting, appreciating 
that failure to do so would have made them appear wholly 
responsible for the protracted deadlock. 
The committee eventually met on 14 June 1955, in an 
endeavour to find common ground which might be the basis on 
which a new award could be .concluded. After considerable 
discussion the recommendation of t4e committee was that the 
1 D. Hansen (President, Christchurch Branch of TEU) to 
OnnnAr. ~ardell File. 1q Apr 1g55. 
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basis for future negotiations be the wage rates paid in 
Wellington, where the full thirteen per cent of the recent 
Court order had been incorporated into all rates, plua.:Jan 
additional 1~d per hour. 
Despite this, after the conclusion of the discussions 
the employers made it clear that any future negotiations on 
wage rates would be linked with the question of the broken 
shift and qualifications clauses. Concerning the 
recommendations of the exploratory committee the Christchurch 
Transport Board passed the following resolutions on 20 June: 
( 1): That it would agree to an increase of ,,1d 2 per 
hour on existing wage rate. 
(2): That the 13% Court Order be applied in the 
manner [prescribed] by the Court. 
(3): That it is understood in making the increase 
there would be a satisfactory settlement of 
the qualification and broken shift clauses, 
the latter on a local basis, as indicated 
by the union. 
(4): That any further submission for an increase 
in wages, beyond the above 1~d be dealt with 
in the normal manner of ,conciliation and 
arbitration. 1 
The Christchurch employers, at least, were making it 
quite clear that they did not intend to be bound by the 
1 Quoted i?n Fardell to Cooper., Fardel:l File, 27 Jun 1955. 
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recommendations of the exploratory committee. As far as 
the Court's order was concerned they emphasized that the 
thirteen per cent was to be paid as a lump sum on the 
basic forty-hour wage, not incorporated as an hourly rate 
which woulli. spread the increase over all rates. 
In reply to th~ Board's offer L.C. Southon, the 
secretary of the Christchurch branch of the workers' union, 
restated the attitude of local members. 
I can scarcely anticipate that the Board's offer 
will be acceptable to the rank and file of my 
branch, as you are well aware that they. reje~ted 
a similar offer approximately two years ago. 
The Outbreak of Militancy 
The wheel had turned the full circle. Each attempt 
at negotiation had done little more than underline the 
extent of the existing stalemate. The employers showed 
little sign of granting an unconditional wage increase 
along the lines of the Wellington settlement. For their 
part the workers were not prepared to accept the additional 
1 
sum Qf 12d per hour for what they regarded as an unfavourable 
alteration in their conditions of work, namely the 
relaxation of the·"broken-shi,ft" ciliause. 
A veiled threat that the workers might seek to· 
employ o.ther methods to gain their demands was containe.d 
in a letter from the national executive of the workers' 
1 Southon to Fardell, Fardell File, 30 Jun 1955. 
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union to the employers union in July • 
••. our assessors have faced some very hostile 
comment both at the annual meeting of our 
National Council and from the floor of Branch 
meetings. This hostility arises from a demand 
to know why we wasted so much time, effort, 
energy and money at futile and abortive Conciliation 
Council meetings for no purpose other than to 
endeavour to :preserve our existing wages .and 
conditions, when other unions, apparently, aJ1fu.iileve 
much better results through other channels.1 · · 
The first official note of militancy appeared in 
August 1955, in what amounted to an ultimatum issued by 
the national executive of the workers' union. The employers 
were informed that five of the six branches of the union 
had "severely criticized" the national executive for not 
preserving comparative margins with other unions of work~rs; 
that the executive remained adamant that they would not go 
beyond the recommendations made by the exploratory committee; 
and that a 'in.ore definite and militant attitude 11 ·would be 
adopted in that, unless the employing authorities confirmed 
the recommendations of the committee, all tramway employees 
throughout the country would combine to work a forty-hour 
week only. 2 
In response to the threat of direct action a ~pecial 
meeting was held at Dunedin on 16 August in order to 
determine the procedure to be adopted by the Employing 
Authorities. A. Cooper, the secretary of the employers' 
1 Hansen to Cooper, .Fardell File, 23 Jul 1955. 
2 Transcript of telephone communication quoted in Cooper 
to Fardell, Fardell File, 5 Aug 1955. 
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association was authorized to inform the national executive 
1 
of the workers union that the employers offered a 12d per 
hour increase on the existing basic award rates of wages, 
subject to agreement on the broken shift clause "where 
1 
required", and that if this was not acceptable to the 
workers, it was the intention of the employers to apply for 
a resumption of conciliation proceedings forthwith. 1 
Faced with the prospects of another round of negotiations 
which promised little hope of an acceptable settlement, on 
31 August the National Council of the Tramway Employees 
Union announced that it had decided to call stopwork meetings 
of the union throughout New Zealand the following week, in 
order to discuss proposals made by the Council that a wage 
claim be made for an immediate increase of 4d per hour, the 
rate to be incorporated in a short term award based on the 
working conditions set out in the then current award. 2 The 
National Council of the union also decided to recommend to 
members that the executive should refuse to meet the 
employers until after the national stop-work meetings, and 
if at that point _the employers failed to concede the wage 
demand, that memb.ers should refuse to work voluntary 
. 3 overtime. 
The aim of the union was that during the· short currency 
of the pr9posed new award discussions could be resumed with 
1 Cooper to Hansen, Fardell File, 16 Aug 1955. 
2 Press, 1 Sep 1955, p.10. 
3 Ibid. 
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the object of having a long-term award made after a complliete 
review of wage rates and working conditions. 
Whatever the merits of such an award the threatened 
sanctions drew an immediate reply from the Minister of 
Labour. 
If the parties cannot settle the dispute by 
discussion around the table, then the proper 
course is for the matter to be referred to the 
Court of Arbitration for settlement ••• I can 
see no reason why the normal procedure should 
not be foliowed in this case, and thus avoid an 
unnecessary stoppage of work and considerable 
inconvenience to the travelling public.1 
The employers stepped up their efforts to force the 
dispute back within the mould of the conciliation and 
arbitration system, Cooper using "every endeavour" to 
arrange a conciliation hearing at the earliest date 
possible. 2 
Despite the numerous discussions, negotiations and 
hearings conducted over the previous eight years only two 
national awards for tramway employees had been registered 
during the period, and the workers viewed the proposals 
for a further conciliation hearing with a certain amount of 
scepticism. To ascertain the feeling of branch members 
towards the dispute the stopwork meetings were held as 
i?cheduled on 8 September. Voting throughout the country 
overwhelmingly endorsed the stand of the National Council, 
only 23 out of nearly two thousand voters rejecting the 
proposal that voluntary overtime end on 19 September.3 
1 . Ibid. 
2 Cooper to Fardell, Fardell File, 1 Sep 1955 
3 Press, 9 Sep 1955, p.14. 
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Equipped as they were with new bargaining strength arising 
from the results of the national vote, the workers now 
agreed to resume concil~ation proceedings. 
Preliminary efforts to reach agreement on wage rates 
failed on 13 'September, the first day of the new hearing and 
the overtime ban was accordingly put into effect as planned 
a week later. 
A further hearing was arranged by the Secretary of 
Labour (H.L. Bockett) for 22 September. At this meeting 
the employers raised their previous of fer of a wage increase 
1 . 
of 12d per hour to 2d, subject, as before, to alterations 
in .the 'lbroken shift'' clause. .In reply the workers reduced 
their original demand for a minimum increase of 4d per hour 
to 2d, conditional upon increases in .shift rates. Both 
parties refused to bridge the gap, but as evidence of a new 
spirit of compromise both sides agreed to discuss oth~r 
clauses still in dispute separately from the wage issue, and 
papers were drawn up for a new Court of Arbitration hearing. 
On the last day of the conciliation hearing a basis 
was established for subsequent negotiations, all clauses in 
the award being discussed. Of the forty-one clauses sixteen 
remained unsettled, and of these it was agreed that eight 
be discussed on a local basis, the remainder being left to 
the discretion of the Court. 
The ban on voluntary overtime lent a new urgency to 
attempts to reach a final settlement of the dispute, and 
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·the return to local negotiations accomplished partial 
success in breaking the deadlock. Early in October the 
Auckland Transport Board reported that it had settled the 
broken shift clause locally for the extra payment of .~d 
per hour on the basic rate, plus an additional sum of 3d 
per hour to be paid for all broken shift duties. 1 
Local negotiations also met with some success in 
Christchurch. Agreement was reached upon the clauses 
dealing with the supply of uniforms and "call-backs" and 
11 call-forwards". It was agreed that this last clause 
would be continued in its entirety in the new award. This 
entailed no alteration in the status quo, but it marked a 
breakthrough in negotiations since it removed one of the 
obstacles in the way of closer understanding between the 
two parties. 
The crucial clause relating to 'broken shifts' remained 
unsettled. The employers claimed the right to the same 
number of broken shifts, approximately seventy, to which 
they had been entitled during the days of tram operation. 
This figure included the broken shift rosters of assistant 
conductors, a· cate_gory which dis appeared with the replacement 
of trams by buses in 1952, and which consequently was not 
c~lculated in the existing award provision. The workers 
rejected this argument on the grounds that the return to 
the conditions of the old award would have the effect of 
1 ~dell File, extract from OTB General Manager's report, 
7 Oct 1955· 
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altering the ratio of broken shifts to straight shifts from 
{ 
one in four to one in three. Further negotiations 
foundered on this issue. 
The Arbitration Hearing: Claims and Counter-Claims 
In keeping with the agreement made during the September 
conciliation hearing the Tramways Dispute was referred to 
arbitration, and the Court convened on 7 November 1955 to 
hear the dispute. The rival claims of the contestants were 
I 
developed in accordance with the positions both had occupied 
at negotiations qnd conciliation hearings over the years, 
the workers' case being concerned almost entirely with 
wage demands, that of the employers with increasing efficiency 
in the public transport industry. 
At the hearing the workers sought to have the basic 
rates o.f tramway employees increased by 1 s per hour. 
Since it haa been agreed that the Court's clause 
incorporating the .effects of the 1954 general 
order should be included in the award, the counter 
proposal [of the workers] actually envisages 
increases of 1/- per hour plus 13% up to ceilings 
as prescribed in the order.1 
Although the employers had eventually offered an increase of 
1 
12d per hour at the last conciliation hearing, in their 
schedule of claims presented at the Court hearing they were 
not willing to concede anything. Aware that in situations 
such as this the Court was likely to bring down a compromise 
decision, the workers claimed as much as they could 
reasonably claim and the employers conceded as little as 
1 Submissions made on :behalf of TEU in CofA, 7 Nov 1955, 
Part 1. n.1. 
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pos'sible. 
The workers also claimed other indirect wage increases. 
It was proposed that a new sub-clause be incorporated into 
the award allowing for the payment of a service bonus of 
11d per hour after two years continuous service, 5a per hour 
2 ! 
after five years and 6d per hour after a total of ten years 
service. A further claim was made for the payment of an 
additional 3d an hour for work done under wet conditions. 1 
Supporting their case the workers' representatives 
pointed to the fact that the present award governing the 
industry had been made four years earlier, on 30 November 
1951, and that it had expired on 30 May 1953. 
We venture to say that there are very few of 
the major awards which have not been renewed 
during that period:t and this, we submit, is 
a pertinent fact when wage claims in particular 
are under consideration. 
As the Court is aware, the majority _of the awards· 
and agreements made subsequent to the 1952 amendlllent 
of the Court giving effect to its standard w,age 
pronouncement of ,that year; have incorporated wage 
increases. Particularly is this tnue of 1954 and 
1955 awards and agreements •. The consequence is 
that wages for our workers have ~eclined relative 
to the majority of other groups. 
Concluding their submissions the workers argued that 
they were also justified in seeking a large wage increase 
because of the nature of the work involved, requiring as 
it did the operation of buses at night, on weekends and on 
public holidays. In their view increased rates of pay 
1 Ibid, p.2. 
2 Ibid. 
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would attract new employees, thereby overcoming the problem 
of the chronic shortage of labour in the industry, and 
wouldrallow workers to receive a "reasonable standard" 
1 of wages for a forty-hour week. 
In their turn the employers reiterated their claim 
for changes in the "broken-shift" clause. They sought to 
I 
have eliminated from the award the proviso which limited 
the number of broken shifts to be worked on trams and 
trolley buses in Wellington to 77. Where Christchurch, 
Dunedin and Invercargill were concerned the employers in 
each case sought to have eliminated from the award the 
ratio specifying the number of "broken-shifts" worked in 
proportion to ordinary shifts. 
The workers' union regarded this as an attempt to 
"break down established conditions of work 11 • 
Speaking of the B~oken Shift clause generally we 
submit that elimination of the provisions setting 
down the ratio of Broken Shifts to Straight is a 
matter about which our union has very strong views. 
It is this clause, coupled [with] the employers' 
adamant demand that it must be altered before any 
consideration whatever would be given to a revision 
of wage rates, that has, more than:,any other matter, 
created unrest in the industry.2 
The union therefore requested that the ratio be set at 
fifteen per cent and that 6d per hour be paid as a bonus 
for all "broken-shift" work. 
1 Ibid, p.23. 
2 Ibid, Part 2, p.9. 
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The Court was faced with the situation that, apart 
from mutual concessions on relatively minor points, over a 
r 
period of several years the two sides had not made any 
significant advance towards a compromise solution which 
balanced the rival claims for increased efficiency and 
·increased wages. Judge Tyndall thus proceeded to impose a 
decision which, IT it 'did riot have the advantage of being 
agreed to by the parties concerned, had the virtue of 
·making equal if minor concessions to both claims. 
1 
The new award increased the basic hourly rate by 22d• 
1 . for operators and 24d for conductors. Similar increases 
were applied to workers engaged in maintenance duties. 
The;"broken-shift" rate was increased by ~d per hour, and . 
the ratio of such shifts was standa.rdized at one in three. 1 
All of the new rates were subject to the. Court of Arbitration' 
recent order of thirteen per cent on the first £12. 
The provisions of the new award were substantially the 
same as those of the old. Eight years of conciliation 
meetings, court hearings and informal negotiations had 
accomplished little for either side. Indeed, the bargaining 
process, far from being terminated for the two year duration 
of the new award, began a new phas,e almost immediately. 
By July 1956 the Wellington Branch of the Tram.way Employees 
Union was already seeking a further increase in the basic 
. 2 
rate for tramway workers. 
j, Press, 3 Dec 1955, p.10 
2 Fardell File, extract from OTB General Manager's Report, 
25 Jul, 1956. 
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What was ·most · sigp.ificant about the· Tramways Dispute -
was not what . was accomplished but the f a:ct that al though 
the dispute was a-pparently interminable, except for.the 
stepwork meetings held in 1955 the contest between the 
opposed claims for increased efficiency and increas.ed, 
\ 
wages took place in an orderly and peaceful fashion. 
By the en~ of 1955, although the operation of the 
.conciliation and arbitration system had given them every 
oppo:rtuni ty to do so, the parties invo.lved in the - . . 
Tramways Dispute had not yet arrived at an acceptable formula 
.for compromise.· But in the light of the frustrating and 
seemingly intractable nature of the dispute the mere 
mai~tenance 0f industrial peace was in itself a remarkable 
achievement. 
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C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The most public form of industrial conflict is the 
strike, but other aspects, which do not obtrude themselves 
into the public consciousness to the same extent, are no 
less important. 
The maintenance of industrial peace is, in itself, a 
notable political achievement. But there is a very real 
. ~ 
danger that maintaining industrial peace, in the sense of 
preventing militant outbreaks, may be the only goal of those 
concerned with regulating industrial conflict. Such a 
peace may well obscure problems which lie at the heart of 
industrial relationse 
What is needed is a more realistic appraisal of 
political problems on the part of those most involved in 
industrial affairs. There should be a growing appreciation 
that, while there are legitimate grounds for conflict 
between workers and employers, these need not prevent the 
two groups from making mutually advantageous concessions. 
The main problem today is to build a more orderly 
wage structure. The annual rounds of wage claims help to 
maintain the momentum of inflation, with serious economic 
repercussions in a country uniquely dependent upon the 
terms of its overseas trade. 
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Some economists suggest.that wage inflation cou£d be 
dealt with along the lines of the 1946 Walsh Report: that 
stability could be achieved within an economy exhibiting an 
accelerated rate of growth, providing that measures.are 
taken to ensure that wages and profits do not outstrip 
production. 
A comprehensive plan for fostering productivity and 
l 
rationalizing wage claims would require the mutual co-opera-
tion of employers and union leaders in the wider introduction 
of incentive schemes. These must have a wider justification 
than a simple drive towards increased productivity. They 
must be built into the structure of awards and take account 
of the claims of both employers and workers, so that they 
do not appear as attempts to circumvent union achievements. 
Strong government action may produce industrial peace, 
but the real problems of industrial relations can only be 
resolved by closer links between the groups concerned; 
through the development of wider .areas of understanding 
within which negotiators and arbitrators can operate. 
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